ARTICLES
ARGUING AND BARGAINING IN
TWO CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES
Jon Elster"
I. INTRODUCrION

In this Article I discuss the process of constitution-making
at the Federal Convention in Philadelphia' and at the Assemblee Constituante in Paris from 1789 to 1791.2 In doing so, I
shall be guided by three objectives. In increasing order of ab-

straction and, I hope, of competence, they are: historical, sociological and conceptual.

First, the comparison between the two eighteenth-century
assemblies can improve our understanding of each, by suggesting lines of investigation that might otherwise not have
occurred to us. A couple of examples, more fully discussed in

Part IV below, will indicate what I have in mind. In view of
the generally dismal view of human nature at the Federal
Convention, we might ask whether similar skeptical ideas can
be identified in the French Assembly. When the debates are

read with this question in mind, we find that the delegates in
Paris were less concerned with the greed and self-interest of
future legislators than with their vanity and pride. Also,
without this comparison I probably would not have grasped
the importance of procedural precommitment in the two assemblies.
* The basis for this Article, the Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School in 1991. was
published as an article in French. Jon Elster. Argumenter et Ndgoder dans Deux Assemb1des Constituantes, 44 REVUE FRANAISE DE SCIENCE POLrf"QUE 187 (1994). The

present version is somewhat modified and updated. It does not, however, amount to
a fully reworked analysis, which I hope to present on some later occasion.
** Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science, Columbia University.
1

For accounts of the American proceedings, see THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
[hereinafter FARRAND].
References to the French proceedings are taken from ARCHIVES PARLEENTAIRES

CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand rev. ed., 1937)
2

DE 1787 A 1860 PREMIRE S-RIE (1789 A 1799) (1875-1888) [hereinafter ARCHIVS
PARLEN=TAIRES]. and will be supplemented with material taken from ORATEURS DE LA
RMvOUnON FRANgAISE: LES CONSrriUANTS (Frangoise Furet & Ran Hal&4 eds.. 1989)

[hereinafter ORATEURS]. Important aspects of the committee debates on the verification of credentials are Illuminated in PROCtS-VERBAL DES CONFERENCES SUR LA
VWRIFICATION DES POUVOIRS (1789) [hereinafter PROCiZS-VERBAL].
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Second, the comparison can provide the beginning of an
understanding of the constitution-making enterprise more
generally. When I first began working on these issues, a wave
of revolutions was sweeping across Eastern Europe. 3 As I
followed the Round Table Talks and later the constitutional
debates in these countries, I was struck time and again by
the similarities with the eighteenth-century processes. In
Poland and Hungary, for instance, the Round Table Talks
that took place under the twin threats of Soviet tanks and
mass demonstrations, brought to mind the deliberations at
Versailles in July 1789, which were similarly suspended between the King's troops and the crowds in Paris. Current
events in the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia remind
us of similar efforts of federation two hundred years ago.
The eighteenth-century constituent assemblies were convened because of general crises of confidence. The current
wave of East European constitution-making followed upon
the fall of communist regimes. Other such waves have occurred in the wake of the revolutionary movement of 1848,

the creation of new states after World War I, the collapse of
fascist regimes after World War II, the liberation of African
and Asian states from colonial rule, and the fall of the South
European dictatorships in the mid-1970s
Nevertheless, a
comparative study of constitution-making is virtually nonexistent. Comparative constitutional law is, of course, an
established discipline. The comparative study of ordinary
lawmaking is a central field of political science. The comparative study of revolutions has a long history. But the literature on constitution-making from a general comparative
perspective is minuscule.5 The gap is puzzling, but it appears
to be undeniable. In the present Article, I cannot go very far
towards filling it. The body of the text will be exclusively devoted to the two eighteenth-century assemblies. In the foot3 See Jon Elster, Constitutionalismin EasternEurope: An Introduction,
58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 447 (1991) (citing some preliminary findings).
4 See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,
45
DUKE L.J. 364, 368-69 (1995) (surveying other countries' constitution-making ef-

forts).

s A useful discussion is found in MARKKU SUSI, MAKING A CONSTrUTION (1995).

The discussion in Chapter 8 of ANDREA BONIME-BLANC, SPAIN'S TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY: THE POLrTCS OF cONSrrrTION-MAKING 135-61 (1987), is limited to transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and does not, for instance, cover such
constitution-making episodes as the Federal Convention. CONSTrIUION MAKERS ON
CONSTrTION MAKING: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT NATIONS (Robert A. Goldwin & Art
Kaufman eds., 1988) describes individual constitution-making episodes, with no
comparative or theoretical perspectives, except for the fact that the contributors were
asked to address the same issues.
PATRICK A. FAFARD & DARREL R. REID,
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (1991), while useful, is mainly descriptive (and to some extent prescriptive).
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notes, however, I shall occasionally suggest a broader perspective.
Third, at a yet higher level of generality, the process of
constitution-making can illuminate the two types of speech
acts I shall refer to as aguig and bargaining.' To understand constitutional proceedings, we can benefit from Jfirgen
Habermas no less than from Thomas Schelling. 8 The analysis of these two types of speech acts and the relation between
them is the main topic of this Article. Although my illustrations wil be taken mainly from the two constituent assemblies, much of what I shall have to say applies more broadly
to ordinary legislatures, committees and similar bodies.
Constituent assemblies are privileged, however, in that
they often exhibit both arguing and bargaining in their most
striking forms. Compared to other assemblies and committees, they differ both in their goal and in their setting. On the
one hand, the matters that have to be decided are far removed from petty, self-interested, routine politics. Because
the goal is to create a legal framework for the indefinite future, the requirement of impartial argument is very strong.
Interest-group pluralism does not work when some of the
parties are generations as yet unborn. The special setting
works in the opposite direction. Constitutions are often
written in times of crises that invite extraordinary and dramatic measures. In Philadelphia, many of the states threatened to leave the union unless they got their way on specific
issues, such as the maintenance of the slave trade or proportional representation of all states in the Senate. The first
threat was successful; the second was not. In Paris, the deliberations of the assembly were conducted under the shadow
of threats, based in an early stage on the King's troops and,
in a later stage, on the crowds in Paris. (The latter threat was
successful; the former was not.)9
6

See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME. AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE

(1989); JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES INTHE THEORY OF SPEECH
ACTS (1979); JOHN R. SEARLE. SPEECHACTS (1969).
7 See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 338-41
(1996) [hereinafter HABERMAS. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]; JORGEN HABEPUMAS.
MORAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COmmNICATnvE ACTION 43-115 (Christian Lenhardt & Shlerry
Weber Nicholsen trans.. MIT Press 1990) (1983) [hereinafter HABERMAS. MORAL
CONSCIOUSNESS]; 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMITUNICATIVE ACTION (Tho-

mas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981) [hereinafter 2 HABRMIAS]: I JORGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMIMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans.. Beacon
Press 1984) (1981) [hereinafter 1 HABERMAS]. Habermas comments on the lectures
that form the basis of the present article in HABERMAS. BErWVEEN FACTS AND NORMS.
supra.
8 See, e.g.. THOMAS C. SCHELUNG. THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
(1960).
9 Among recent episodes. the Canadian one strildngly embodies
the horse-trading
aspects of constitution-maklng.
See generally ANDREV COHEN. A DEAL UrONmE
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Hence, constituent assemblies are often more polarized
than ordinary law-making bodies. They are not engaged in
politics as usual, but oscillate between what Bruce Ackerman
calls "higher law-making"10 and sheer appeal to force. As
Tocqueville said, in times of crises the political actors either
rise above the normal or fall below it." This is one reason for
considering the Records of the FederalConvention rather than
The FederalistPapers. The latter document shows no trace of
the overt or covert threats that figured prominently at the
Convention itself.
In exploring the role of rational argument and threatbased bargaining in collective decision-making I also try to
correct an imbalance. I believe that social choice theory and
public choice theory have created an excessive focus on voting and agenda-making in the study of assembly behavior. 2 I
am not denying, of course, that these theories have had an
enormous and, in the main, beneficial impact. In fact, a social-choice theoretic analysis of the Federal Convention has
proved very fruitful. 3 I am simply claiming that these analyses are far from capturing all that goes on in an assembly.
Now, it might seem that public choice theory already incorporates elements of bargaining by the analysis of logrolling and
vote-trading. However, threats and promises made in this
context are based mainly on resources (e.g., votes) created
within the legislative system. In this Article, I am more concerned with bargaining on the basis of extra-parliamentary
resources, such as manpower and money.
Yet this extension remains firmly within the public choice
perspective. It is based on the assumption that the actors are
moved by rational self-interest, and that there are no penalties attached to the expression of self-interest. By insisting
on the role of rational argument in collective decision-making,
I deliberately abandon that assumption. On the one hand, I
(1991).
10BRUCEACKERMAN, 1 WETHE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991).
n ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 199 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Harper Collins 1988) (1835).
12 See generally, DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989); WILLIAM H. RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982). A partial exception to this characterization can
be seen in Evelyn Carol Fink, Political Rhetoric and Strategic Choice in the Ratification Conventions on the U.S. Constitution (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Rochester) (on file with the Harvard University Library). In her attempt
to carve out a place for rhetoric, persuasion and argument in political assemblies,
Fink does not, however, pay attention to the element of impartialitythat is crucial to
thePresent analysis.
1 See William H. Riker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-Maklng: The Presidency
in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1

(1984).
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believe that in the two constituent assemblies some of the
actors were genuinely moved by impartial considerations of
the common good. On the other hand, and this may be the
more important part of my argument, I claim that even the
actors whose concerns were purely self-interested may have
been forced or induced to substitute the language of impartial
argument for the language of self-interest I claim, moreover,
that this substitution mattered for the outcomes, because of
what we may think of as the civilizingforce of hypocrisy.
An overview of what follows may be useful. Part II offers a
brief survey of the main constitutional issues at stake in
Paris and Philadelphia. Part III looks at some problems and
paradoxes created by the constitution and self-constitution of
the constituent assemblies. Part IV considers various aspects
of constitutional arguing in the two assemblies. Part V discusses the role of bargaining in the constitutional context In
Part VI, the distinction between arguing and bargaining is
partially transcended in a discussion of the strategic uses of
rational argument. In other words, these three core Parts of
the Article (Parts IV-V1) discuss, respectively, the role of reason, overt self-interest, and covert self-interest in constitutional debates. Part VII offers a brief conclusion.
H. CONS=T

IONAL ISSUES

The topic of this Article being the process of constitutionmaking rather than the substantive contents of the documents that emerged, I shall not go deeply into issues of constitutional doctrine. Nevertheless, a brief survey of the main
questions is required to prepare the ground for the more process-oriented analyses that follow.
Generally speaking, a constitution contains three main
kinds of clauses governing first, the machinery of government, second, the assignment of rights, and third, the procedures for amending the constitution itself.'4 I discuss these
in turn.
In both eighteenth-century assemblies, the main debates
over the machinery of government concerned the organization
of the legislature and the relation between the legislative and
the executive powers. '5 Yet this general similarity obscures
14 Bernard Manin has impressed upon me the importance of clauses that govern
the suspensfon of a constitution. As the issue of emergency powers played no role in
the two assemblies, I shall Ignore it here. For some brief comments, see Chapter I1 of

JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND (forthcoming May 2000).

15 For the French debates and their background, I rely heavily on JEAN EGRET.
LA
I-VOLUTION DES NOTABLES (1950). ROBERT D. HARRIS. NECKER AND THE REVOLUTION OF
1789 (1986), and ANDRP, CASTALDO, LES MIaHODES DE TRAVAIL DE LA CONSTITUANrE
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the fact that in each assembly the most burning debates were
over issues that had no analogue in the other. America was a
federally organized country; France was not. Hence, the debate in Philadelphia over the representation of the small
states in the Senate had no direct analogue in France. 6 Also,
the representation of slaveholding territories, although the
object of several discussions in the French assembly, was
much less central than at the Convention. France was a
monarchy and was universally expected- at least at the time
when the assembly debated the royal veto- to remain one.
America was not a monarchy and, Hamilton's proposal for an
elective monarch aside,' 8 nobody at the Convention argued
that it should become one. Hence the French debate over the
King's veto, including his veto over the constitution itself,
could have no American analogue. Moreover, the idea of an
absolute veto for the executive- the object of heated debates
in Paris- was summarily dismissed in Philadelphia. 9 Also,
in Philadelphia there were few objections to the principle of
bicameralism, 20 which in Paris was hotly debated and, in the
end, rejected.
In England, in the Seventeenth Century, and in America
and France in the Eighteenth Century, we can observe a
three-stage sequence. In the first stage, there is a strong
monarchy which is perceived as arbitrary and tyrannical. In
the second stage, this monarchy is replaced by a parliamentary regime. In the third stage, when it is discovered that
parliament can be just as tyrannical and arbitrary as the
king, some form of checks and balances is introduced. In
1787, the Americans went from the second to the third stage.
In 1789, the French went from the first to the second stage.
The pathologies of the second stage, and the transition to the
third stage, came later. This provides the main reason for the
difference in tenor in the two debates. The Americans were
concerned with protecting themselves against the solution
which the French were just in the process of inventing (or re(1989).

For the American debates and their background I have mainly consulted

THORNTON ANDERSON,
CREATING THE CONSTITUTION (1993), CALVIN C. JILLSON,
CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
(1988), CATHY D. MATSON & PETER S. ONUF, A UNION OF INTEREST (1990), and GORDON
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
16 Later I note, however, that at an abstract level the French

discussion of voting

by order or by head can be seen as analogous to this debate.
17 See generally 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES,
supranote 2,

at 164-69, 186-88; 26
ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2, at 636; 27 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES. supra
note 2, at 12-19.
18 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at
288-89.
19 See id. at 200.
20 See id. at 336; WOOD, supra note 15, at 553.
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inventing) 21
Today, the inclusion of a bill of rights in constitutions is a
The American and French framers
matter of course.'
thought differently. Some of the American delegates thought
a bill of rights would be dangerous, as it might suggest that
every right not included in the enumeration could be freely
violated by the government. Because the Constitution restricted the powers of the government by enumerating them,
it was felt that enumerating the rights might similarly be
viewed as restrictive.23 Delegates from the Southern States
had a different objection: "[A bill of rights] generally begin[s]
with declaring that all men are by nature born free. Now, we
should make that declaration with a very bad grace, when a
large part of our property consists in men who are actually
born slaves."2 In the end, the arguments against the bill of
rights carried the day. At the Assemblde Constituante voices
were raised against adopting a bill of rights before the constitution as a whole was written. However, their motive was
fear of granting too many rights rather than too few. Two of
the most prominent moderates, Lally-TolendalP and Malouet2 argued that a bill of rights might give the people exaggerated, confused, and dangerous ideas about their liberties,
and argued for a postponement. In the atmosphere that
reigned at the time, they were sitting ducks for Target's assertion that "[tihe truth can never be dangerous."'
Over and above the issue of specific rights, two more general questions were important in the Eighteenth-Century assemblies. One was whether rights attach only to individuals,
or whether a collectivity can also be the bearer of rights. In
Philadelphia the strongest opponent of states' rights was
James Wilson: "[clan we forget for whom we are forming a
Government? Is it for men or for the imaginary beings called
According to M.J.C. Vile. "the use of the power of Parliament by one group of Its
supporters to threaten other groups had shown to men who had previously seen only
the royal power as a danger, that a parliament could be as tyrannical as a king."
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTriurioNAuiSM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 43 (1998). This
statement, although made about England after 1648. is also valid for the United
States after 1776 and France after 1791.
22All constitutions or draft constitutions in post-1989 Eastern Europe. for nstance, include a bill of rights.
See WOOD, supranote 15. at 537; see also 3 FARRAND, supra note 1. at 143-44
(citing a similar statement along these lines by James Wilson in the Pennsylvania
Convention). The Ninth Amendment reflects this concern.
2A 3 FARRAND, supranote 1. at 256 (statement of C.C. Pinckney in the South Carolina House of Representatives).
See 8 ARCHIvES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2. at 222-23.
See fd. at 322-23.
See i. at 320.
21

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 2:2

0 Advocates
States?"2
of individual rights argued that states
ought to be represented in the federal assembly proportionally to their population, whereas those who believed in the
rights of states argued for equal representation. In such
cases, where right stands against right, the outcome is usually either breakdown or compromise. In the United States
the compromise was equal representation in the upper house
and proportional in the lower. At the Federal Convention
proposals were also made to strike a compromise within the
Senate itself, by which the representation of the smaller
states would go beyond proportionality but fall short of
equality.'
The other question concerned the conditions for granting
political rights, notably the right to vote and to be elected. At
the time, such rights were perceived not as unconditional,
but as contingent on contribution to one's country. The idea
was not only "no taxation without representation," but
equally "no representation without taxation." Sleyes, for instance, made an influential distinction between active and
passive citizens: 30 women, children and others who did not
contribute to the maintenance of the public establishment
should not have the right to influence policy.3 "Although all
should be able to enjoy the benefits of living in society, only
those who make a contribution to the public establishment
form the real shareholders in the great social enterprise." 32
Contribution includes not only paying taxes, but also defending one's country.? In Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin
insisted strongly on this idea: "in time of war a country owed
much to the lower class of citizens. Our late war was an instance of what they could suffer and perform. If denied the
right of suffrage it would debase their spirit and detach them
from the interest of the country."34 In Paris, ClermontTonnerre made a brief reference to the fact that Jews served
in the national militia, to refute one of several arguments for
denying them citizenship and, afortior, the right to vote.?
This conception of society as a joint venture for mutual

1 FARRAND. supranote 1, at 483.
See id. at 405-06, 488, 489-91, 510-11; 2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 5-6. A
system of this kind was adopted in the West German constitution of 1949. See
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 51.2 (F.R.G.).
30 For an account of this distinction and its
fate, see JEAN-DENIS BREDIN, SI YitS:
LA CLP DE LA RgvOLUTION FRANQAISE, 159-66 (1988).
31 Id. at 60.
32 I ORATEURS, supranote 2, at
1014.
28
29

35

2 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 210.
10 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2, at 755-56.
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advantage goes back at least to classical Athens, where citizens were disenfranchised for cowardice in war and for unpaid debts to the state." It falls short of the fully impartial
view that underlies the bills of rights in modem constitutions- 7 A Twentieth-Century constitution may have clauses
imposing the duty to do military service and pay taxes and
another clause granting the right to vote, but we do not find
clauses that make rights conditional upon the fulfillment of
duties. We should note, however, that the conditionality
sometimes pertained to collectivities rather than to individuals. In the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, for instance,
membership in the Senate was proportioned to districts in
accordance with the amount of public taxes paid by the inhabitants. That arrangement might, of course, be seen as reflecting the interests of property rather than a collective right
based on collective contribution. The latter motivation, however, is explicit in Thouret's proposal in the Assembl~e Constituante for the organization of the electoral system. He
stipulated that representation would be based in equal parts
on territory, population and tax payments, justifying the last
criterion by arguing that "itis just that the region which
contributes most to the needs and the support of the public
larger part in the
establishment should have a proportionally
"3
Thouret added that
governance of that establishment
while relative contributions should not define individual
rights, since this may lead to the emergence of an aristocracy
of wealth, there was no such danger if the amount of contributions was considered in the aggregate.
Finally, the constituent assembly has to choose a procedure for amending the constitution. The harder it is to
change the constitution, the more people tend to view it as a
given framework for policy rather than as a tool for policy. Of
course, they may also come to see it as an intolerable prison,
hence the need for an optimal rigidity of the constitution. As
Lally-Tolendal said in the Assemblae Constituante, "it must

See D.M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW INCLASSICALATHENS 160, 165 (1978).
See generally 1 BRIAN M. BARRY, A TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: THEORIES OF
JUSTICE (1989) (discussing extensively both classical and modem conceptions of society).

9 ARCHIVES PARLEEWNTAIRES. supranote 2. at 203.
See i. at 204. Thouret's proposal did, however, stipulate that only those who
paid annual taxes equal to three days' salary would have the right to vote. See &.
What he excludes is a system of plural voting that would give, for instance, to each
individual a number of votes proportional to his tax payment. Tax payment. in his
proposal, served as a threshold in the determination of who should vote and as a
proportionality factor in the determination of the number of delegates they could
elect
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On the one

hand, "[c]onstitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in their sane moments that they may not die by a suicidal hand in the day of their frenzy."41 On the other hand,
we should keep in mind a dictum of constitutional lawyers,
ascribed to Justice Robert Jackson: the Constitution is not a
suicide pact. 42 It must be possible to unbind oneself in an

emergency. Society must not be confined too tightly.'
To strike the right balance between rigidity and flexibility a
number of devices can be used, singly or in combination.
First, one can require qualified majorities for changes in the
constitution. The purpose is to guard against instability, so
that the constitution remains unaffected even when majorities fluctuate between forty-nine and fifty-one percent. Second, one can impose delaying or "cooling" devices, for instance by requiring changes to be passed or proposed by
several successive parliaments.
This was the solution
adopted in the French Constitution of 1791. Delays protect
society against itself, by forcing passionate majorities,
whether simple or qualified, to cool down and reconsider.
Third, federally organized countries can require that any
changes be passed by all, or a qualified majority, of the republics. This was the solution adopted at the Federal Convention, to protect the states against the federal government.
This solution may also serve as a delaying device. Finally,
one can write periodic revisions of the constitution into the
document itself, to protect later generations from the tyranny
of their predecessors and provide the necessary time for constitutional arrangements to work themselves out, in order to
8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2,
at 517.
JOHN E. FINN, CONSTmIONS IN CRISIS 5 (1991)
(quoting John Potter Stockton In
the congressional debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871). The author discusses
the general theme of constitution-making as self-binding in Chapter 2 of his work
JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND (forthcoming May 2000) (revising his previous assertions in JON ELSrER. ULYSSES AND SIRENS 88-103 (1984)).
42 See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (warning that the Court's decision may have moved far enough toward embracing civil liberties so as to turn the Bill of Rights into a "suicide pact").
Tocquevflle warned against the excessively
stringent amendment procedures
proposed for the constitution.
I have long thought that, instead of trying to make our forms of government
eternal, we should pay attention to making methodical change an easy matter.
All things considered, I find that less dangerous than the opposite alternative.
I thought one should treat the French people like those lunatics whom one Is
careful not to bind lest they become infuriated by the constraint.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, RECOLLECTIONS: THE FRENCH REVOLTION OF 1848, at 181
(J.P.Mayer & A!P. Kerr eds. & George Lawrence trans., Transaction Publishers 1987)
(1893) (hereinafter TOCQUEVILLE, RECOLLECTIONS]. The implication, whether intended
or not, is that by making change easier one reduces the desire for change. Needless
to say, there could also be more rational motives for loosening the ties.
40
41
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ensure that they will not be discarded prematurely. This solution was discussed at length in the French assembly.'" To
meet the objection that fixed revisions would create unrest
among the citizens,4 the proposal was floated to introduce a
constitutional conventions to the
random element by likg
death of the monarch.
Earlier I said that I focus on process rather than substance. That assertion can be made more precise. I am trying to construct a framework for understanding the events
that lead up to the adoption of a constitution. The further
fate of that document falls outside the scope of this Article. I
am concerned with the upstream causes of the constitution,
not with its downstream consequences. (I shall, however, be
concerned with anticipateddownstream effects). Specifically,
I shall not explain why the American Constitution succeeded
whereas the French did not. Furthermore, it is not clear
what one means by success in this connection. Minimally, it
must imply that the constitution matters. For this to be the
case, three conditions must exist. The constitutions must
have precise, enforceable implications for behavior. Those
implications must in fact be enforced. And this enforcement
must be causally linked to the existence of the constitution.
More ambitiously, one could demand that the constitution
must work. It must prevent actors or institutions from
usurping power and enable the political system to make decisions and stick to them. It must prevent tyranny as well as
deadlock and vacillation. Finally, we may require of a successful constitution that it should last for some substantial
period of time, in the sense that any constitutional changes
are made according to rules laid down in the constitution itself. It is a logical truth that a constitution that works will
also matter, and a plausible causal proposition that it will
also endure. However, constitutions can last even if they do
not matter, as evidenced by the 1936 constitution of the So47 They can last and
viet Union, which lasted for 45 years.
matter even if they do not work very well, as shown by the
44 See 31 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supranote 2. at 36. 39. 67.
45 Madison made the same objection to Jeffersons proposal of periodical constitu-

tional conventions in the United States. See Stephen Holmes. Precommnment and
the Paradoxof Democracy, in CONSTUTONAUSM AND DEMiOCRACY 195. 217-18 (Jon
Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (citing Letter of James Madison (February 4.
1790). in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MDISON 22 (Charles Hobson & Robert Rutland
eds., 1981)). That proposal was not put on the table at the Convention. however.
46 See 30 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supranote 2. at 97.
47 ,he 1968 Czechoslovak constitution is paradoxical in this respect. Although it
never mattered during the Communist period. Its provisions profoundly shaped and
constrained the post-Communist constitutional developments. It came alive, as it
were, only after its death.
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Third French Republic, which lasted for 65 years. For purposes of positive analysis, the best working definition of success is to require that the constitution endure and matter, as
the notion of what works is inevitably value-laden. To explain
why some constitutions succeed and others don't, one can focus either on ex ante conditions of adoption or on ex post
events, such as exogenous political struggles 49 or the presence of exceptional personalities.'
Although I shall not pursue this explanatory question, a
closely related issue is germane to my argument. I shall assume, namely, that constitution-makers aim at producing a
document that will work, matter and endure. There are two
possible exceptions to this assertion. Some framers may not
care whether the constitution matters; and some may want it
not to last. The first exception arises with regard to statements of intentions that have mainly symbolic value and no
enforceable content.5 ' Although their advocates usually argue
that these clauses may have an impact by changing the values and priorities of the citizens, such effects are largely a
matter of faith.'2 The second exception is more relevant in
the present context. It arises with regard to "constitutionwreckers", members of the old regime who want the constitution to fail so as to create the conditions for a restoration.3
In the Assemblae Constituante, the moderate faction (the
"monarchists") believed that the nobility and
upper clergy
were practicing a policy of crisis maximization; specifically,
According to Riker, "near unanimous [constitutional] conventions
are more successful than politically divided ones because those who thoroughly agree are better
able to write a coherent document than whose [sic] who do not." William H. Riker,
The Lessons of 1787, 55 PUB. CHOICE 5, 9 (1987); see also ADAM PRZEwORSKI.
DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET 81 (1991) (distinguishing among cases In which the balance of forces is (I) known and uneven, (ii) known and balanced, and (ill) unknown,
arguing that the first is the least and the third the most favorable to constitutional
stability).
49 Without the split of the Second International, the
Weimar Constitution might
have proved more durable.
so In the period between the First and Second World Wars,
one may cite President
Masaryk of Czechoslovakia or President Pilsudski of Poland as two such personali-

ties.

51 Statements of positive rights, such as the right
to work, illustrate this case. It
is somewhat inaccurate to say that those who advocate such rights do not care
whether the constitution works. Rather, they want the constitution to work in other
respects, so that their favored clause can benefit from the prestige that efficiency
confers on the constitution as a whole. Of course, each additional free-rider clause
of this kind may detract from the prestige one Is trying to exploit.
52 See, e.g., Gary B. Melton & Michael J. Saks, The
Law as an Instrument of Socializattonand Social Structure, in THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 235 (Gary B.
Melton ed., 1986).
53The role of the former Communists in the
constituent assemblies of Eastern
Europe might be worth examining in this perspective.
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that their vote against an upper chamber in the legislature
was grounded in a fear that this institution would stabilize
the new regime.' An alternative, perhaps more plausible explanation involves feelings of envy and jealousy: the nobility
did not want to see the creation of a new aristocracy that
would not be recruited from their ranks.0
Be this as it may, the large majority of framers in the two
assemblies were preoccupied with the durability and effectiveness of the document they were writing. Although there
were voices at the Federal Convention who argued for the
adoption of a temporary or incomplete constitution, on the
grounds that it could always be improved later, the idea was
firmly rebutted by the two most influential framers. Madison
argued that in other countries it had been difficult to reform
constitutions even when they were acknowledged to be defective. He claimed that "Itlhe fear of Innovation, and the Hue &
Cry in favor of the Liberty of the people will prevent the necessary Reforms ....

."5

Hamilton, similarly, claimed that the

present occasion was a chance not to be missed: "It is a
miracle that we were now here exercising our tranquil & free
deliberations on the subject It would be madness to trust to
future miracles."57
The French framers were no less insistent on the unique
nature of their assembly. Mounier, for instance, argued that
the strong unicameral assembly that was necessary to create
the constitution would be inappropriate for ordinary lawmaking. s Similarly, Mirabeau argued that the King should
have veto power in the constitution, but not over the constitution itself. Although created by the King, and creating a
legislature that would be subject to the King, the Constituent
54 See EGREr, supra note 15. at 152.

55See &L
1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 478.
at 467. An additional argument against a temporary constitution is that if it
57 I.
failed one could never be sure whether the failure was due to inherent defects or to
the fact that it was known to be temporary. See JON ELSTER. SOLOMOmC JUDwmIErS
192 (1989). With regard to West Germany in 1948, it has been argued that agreement on the constitution was facilitated by its provisional nature. 'because vested
interests could anticipate an early revision favoring issues which they considered
vital" PE=ERH. MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WESr GERMAN REPUBiC 84 (1963). In fact.
Merkl goes on to claim that the provisional nature of the constitution facilitated not
only its adoption but its survival: "[N]othing is as lasting as an improvisation." Id. I
doubt whether this last generalization would stand up to scrutiny, however.
Tocqueville's analysis of the French constitution-making process in 1848 suggests
the opposite and more plausible view. that make-shift documents tend to contain
See TOCUEviLUE.
gaps and inconsistencies that make them unworkable.
IONS, supranote 43, at 167-83.
RECOL
See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMNTAIRES, supra note 2. at 555.
5 See fi at 538.
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Assembly itself could not be bound by anyone. Summarizing
both points, Clermont-Tonnerre observed that the "threeheaded hydra"- king, first chamber and second chambercreated by the constitution could not itself have created a constitution.
For him, the privileged character of the Constituent Assembly, by virtue of which it could be a law unto itself,
derived from the extraordinary circumstances in which it operated.6 1 "Anarchy is a frightening but necessary transitional
stage; the only moment in which a new order of things can be
created. It is not in calm times that one can take uniform
measures." 62 The next Part elaborates on this argument.
Il.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

I now consider the convocation and organization of the two
constituent assemblies. In a process of this kind, a number
of decisions have to be made. First, the assembly has to be
convoked. Second, a procedure for selecting or electing delegates has to be adopted. Third, the mandate of the assembly
and of the delegates has to be defined in terms of constraints
on what must be included and what cannot be included in
the final document. Fourth, once the delegates meet, their
credentials have to be verified so that the assembly can be
formally constituted. Fifth, an internal decision-making procedure of the assembly has to be specified. Finally, a mode of
ratifying the constitution has to be laid down.
These decisions may flow either from an outside authority
or from the assembly itself. The first two decisions must
clearly be taken by outside sources. The decision to convene
the assembly must be made by a preexisting authority. In
our two cases, this authority was found in the Continental
Congress and the King of France. 4 The mechanism by which
60 See id. at 574.
61

See id.

62 9 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note
2, at 461.

63 For a fuller discussion of some of the issues
raised in this Part, see generally
Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Paris and Philadelphia, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 549 (1993) (discussing some of the issues raised in this section more fully);
Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475
(1995) (discussing the American founding specifically).
64 That authority could be the constitution
itself, if it calls for periodic constitutional conventions; an occupying power, as in Japan or West Germany after World
War II; a provisional government, as in France in 1848; or Round Table Talks between the old regime and the opposition, as in Poland. Hungary and Bulgaria in
1989-90. Although a self-convening assembly is a logical impossibility, the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 does to some extent fit that description. On March 5 1848,
fifty-one self-selected leaders of the public met in Heidelberg to discuss Germany's
future. They convened a Vorparlament that met in Frankfurt on March 31. That
body voted for elections to a constituent assembly and set up a committee to help
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delegates are elected or selected must also be in existence
prior to the assembly itself. In the cases that concern me
here, and in most others of interest, these two outside
authorities do not coincide.' Although Louis XVI decided the
convocation of the Estates General, he could not pick the
delegates. When he tried to obtain the power to verify their
credentials, he was rebuffed. Whereas the Continental Congress made the decision to convene the Federal Convention,
the state legislatures chose the delegates.
The assembly is obviously incapable of deciding the initial
convocation and delegation. It can, however, arrogate to itself
the power over all other decisions. To varying degrees this is
what happened in the two Eighteenth-Century assemblies.
They verified their own credentials and set many of their own
rules, sometimes overruling their instructions, sometimes
supplementing them. The tension between the assemblies
and their conveners- between the creature and its creatorwas at the heart of both processes. In Philadelphia, the state
legislatures, which were the source of the authority of the
delegates, were also perceived by many as a major obstacle to
their efforts. In Paris, there was a somewhat similar relationship between the King and the assembly. The general form of
the paradox is simple. On the one hand, it seems to be a
general principle that if X brings Y into being, then X has an
authority superior to that of Y.' On the other hand, If Y is
brought into being to regulate, among other things, the activities of X, Y would seem to be the superior instance. The
paradox can also be summarized in two opposing slogans,
"Let the kingmaker beware of the king" versus "Let the king
beware of the kingmaker." These relationships obtain both
between the assembly and its convener and between the delegates and their constituencies. Collectively, the delegates owe
their existence to one institution; individually, to another.
These facts are crucial for understanding the debates in both
assemblies.
administer them. The assembly then met on May 18 of the same year. See H.W.
KOCH, A CONsTrrmoNAL ISTORY OF GEMIANY 52-58 (1984).
65 Such coincidence would indicate that we are dealing with a mere puppet assembly, with no will of its own. An example would be the body of 66 men convened
in China by Yuan Shikai in 1914 to give his rule a semblance of legality through a
"constitutional compact." See CH'IEN TUAN-SHENG, THE GOVERNMEr AND POLITICS OF
CHINA 1912-1949, at 61-64 (1950).
6S I am not denying the close ties between the legislatures and Congress.
However, the legislatures acting collectively through Congress to call a convention should
not be confused with their individual power to select delegates.
67 This principle, however, gives rise to a paradox if the amending clause of a constitution is used to amend itself. See generally PETER SUBER. THE PARADOX OF SELFPmNDMENT (1990).
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In both cases, the assemblies got the upper hand against
their creators. The delegates at the Federal Convention succeeded in replacing the state legislatures with special conventions as the ratifying bodies. Also, they tacitly overruled
Congress when they demanded ratification by nine out of the
thirteen states instead of the unanimity that governed
changes in the Articles of Confederation. The French delegates turned the King's veto in the constitution into a merely
suspensive one, and his veto over the constitution into a mere
formality.& Also, they ignored the instructions of their constituents on a number of crucial issues. This outcome
should not be surprising. Almost by definition, the old regime is part of the problem that a constituent assembly has
to solve. But if the regime is flawed, why should the assembly respect its instructions?
I now turn to a more systematic analysis of the six steps:
convocation, selection of delegates, specifying the mandate,
verifying the credentials of the delegates, defining procedural
rules, and choosing a mode of ratification.
In both countries, the assemblies were convoked during
and because of a general crisis in the country. As I argue in
Part V below, this fact is important not only in understanding
the origin of the assemblies, but also in trying to explain the
nature of the document they produced. In a crisis, time is at
a premium. The urgent need to reach agreement has the effect of equalizing bargaining power. I shall draw on this fact
in the analysis of the bargaining between the small and the
large states over the representation in the Senate.
With regard to France in 1789, the assertion of a crisis is a
truism.9 The finances of the kingdom were in a shambles

68 This kind of outcome occurs quite frequently.
Whenever the assembly Is more
than a mere puppet body the convoking authorities rarely succeed in imposing their
will on it. The Japanese Constitution of 1946 Is the only clear case that comes to
mind. See generally KOSEKI SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONsTrrturION
(Ray A. Moore ed. & trans., Westview Press 1997). The Western occupying powers
had some influence on the West German Constitution of 1949. but substantially less
than they had hoped for. According to Merkl,
the French Foreign Secretary, Robert Schumann, declared in a speech that
only a federal system of considerable decentralization of German governmental
powers was consistent with peace and acceptable to his government. The
third draft of the Basic Law, however, contained elements he considered conducive to a centralistic trend. This was, perhaps, the first time in the history
of modem constitutionalism that a victorious power attempted to secure Itself
against revenge or aggression by '"constitutional 'engineering". Such a policy
presupposes a naive belief in the restraining force of constitutional clauses
imposed by a foreign power on a defeated nation.
MERKL, supra note 57, at 120-21 (citation omitted); see also Id. at 103, 117, 123.
When the assembly is convened by an internal authority, as distinct from a foreign
power, it is even less likely to listen to dictates.
69 A marvellous introduction to the pre-revolutionary situation
Is found in ALEXIS
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because of military over-commitments. The last harvest had
been disastrous, and the winter cruel. Moreover, these acute
pressures emerged from a background of chronic anomie.
The hierarchies were crumbling. All classes harbored intense
resentments against each other or against the royal administration. Intellectual criticism was rampant. Although the
direct object for calling the Estates General was to raise revenue, they were ineluctably transformed into a general attack
on privilege.
With regard to America in 1787, the assertion of a general
crisis is more controversial."0 Although the economy was
prosperous, there was a widespread belief that the country
was badly governed. 7 ' The state legislatures, according to
this perception, acted on partisan and myopic motives, and
Congress was too weak to restrain or coordinate its behavior.
Moreover, many believed that this political misbehavior was
having dire economic consequences, such as the printing of
paper money, the cancellation of debts and the confiscation of
property. For the purpose of explaining behavior at the Convention, the existence of these beliefs is more important than
their accuracy.
From this comparison between the two countries we can
draw the following implication. In France, the stage was set
for a revolution from below, against privilege and royal power.
In America, the constituent assembly carried out what
amounted to a revolution from above against unfettered democracy and radical republicanism.' While their opponents
came from opposite ends of the political spectrum, the French
and the American framers shared the same ideal, that of a
deliberative and representative mode of government. In the
American context, the implementation of this ideal was perceived by many as a step backward. In France, it was not
only one but several steps forward. I shall have more to say
about the ideal itself in Part IV below.
I now turn to the mode of selecting delegates. In the Assemblie Constituante, delegates were selected both from regions and from the three estates. On three points related to
this procedure, Jacques Necker played a crucial role in perDE TOCQUEVILLE. THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REvoumoN (Stuart Gilbert trans..

The best modem overview Is PIERRE
Doubleday Anchor Books 1955) (1858).
GOUBER r & DANIEL ROCHE. LES FRANAIS ET L.ANCIEN REGIME (1984).
70 A recent overview can be found in CATHY D. MATSON & PErER S. ONUF. A UNION
OF INTERESTS (1990).
71 See WOOD, supra note 15, at 393-429; see also JILLSON. supra
note 15. at 23-24
(stating that the existng political situation was believed to be 'peculiarly criltical")
(citation omitted).
See text accompanying supranote 15.
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suading the King to deviate from the stipulations laid down
by the Assembly of Notables that had met in November
1788. 7" First, he got acceptance for the principle that the
Third Estate should have twice as many delegates as each of
the other orders. Second, he ensured that the number of
deputies would be proportional to the population and tax
contribution of the electoral districts, whereas the notables
wanted equal representation for all districts, although they
varied in size from 6000 to 600,000. Third, he made it possible for electoral assemblies of the Third Estate to choose as
delegates members of the other two orders. Both Mirabeau
and Sieyes owed their presence in the assembly to this innovation. The Provincial assembly of the Dauphin6, which
spearheaded the transformation of the Estates General into a
national assembly, went even further and adopted a kind of
converse of the last principle, such that delegates from each
estate were elected by votes from members of all three estates.7 4 On a national scale, however, little is known about
the elections of the 1200 delegates to the French assembly.
Although case studies of the elections in the Dauphin&7
Brittany,n and Burgundy 8 demonstrate considerable strategic manipulation, no synoptic view is available.
The delegates to the Federal Convention were elected indirectly, by the state legislatures rather than by the voters. 0
Although there were voices for having the delegates appointed
by conventions called expressly for that purpose,' the idea
did not make its way. As a consequence, the debates at the
Convention remained, to some extent, under the shadow of
the state legislatures. A further consequence of this mode of
election was that the delegates were certain to be part of the
power establishment, deeply familiar with politics at the state
and confederate levels. Whether the outcome would have
been similar had they been chosen at specially called con73 The following draws on Chapter 9 of ROBERT D. HARRIS, NECKER AND THE
REVOLUTION OF 1789, at 297-337 (1986), and on ANDRI CASTALDO, LES MTi-ODES DE
TRAVAIL DE LA CONSTrUANTE (1989).
74 JEAN EGRET, LES DERNIERS ETATS DE DAUPHINIt
153 (1942).
75 FRANCOIS FUREr, LA REVOLUTION 75 (1988).
76 See generally EGRET, supra note 74.
77 See generally A- COCHIN, LES SOCitirs DE PENSIE Er LA DMOCRATIE
211-31

(1912).
78 See id. at 235-82.
See JILLSON, supranote 15, at 208 n.2 ("[Voting in the Convention was by state
delegation, rather than by individual delegate. .. ").
so See 1 THE FOUNDER'S CONsTITUrION 188 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds.,
1987) (quoting John Jay that in Congress' opinion, "it would be expedient for the
people of the States... to appoint State Conventions... with the sole and express
power of appointing Deputies ....
).
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ventions is, of course, hard to tell.
The constituent assembly is made up of individuals. In
some assemblies, this logical truth also reflects a political reality. In the Assembl~e Constituante, the majority of the
delegates actually voted as individuals, because they did not
want to be captured by any of the organized groups in the assembly.8 This fact explains the fluid, volatile and unpredictable character of the proceedings. Later, I shall explain how
Mounier refused to strike a deal with the patriots over the issues of bicameralism, veto, and the right to dissolve parliament. One of several possible explanations is that he did not
trust the ability of his opponents to deliver. The delegates
were at nobody's beck and call. I am not implying that they
were sturdy individualists who preferred to make up their
own minds. They were volatile individually, as well as collectively, and were highly susceptible to the eloquence of a Mirabeau or a Robespierre, to moods and fashions, and to ruHowever, they could not be
mors and apprehensions.
rounded up and delivered as a bloc of votes. Anyone who has
ever tried to gather together the mercury from a shattered
thermometer will know what I mean.
At the Federal Convention, the delegates represented their
states and voted as a single bloc. The delegates from a given
state, however, were not always of a single mind. It has been
calculated that among them, the states that sent delegates to
the Convention contained approximately three dozen welldefinedpolitical factions, all but a few of which were represented. Although only 3% of the estimated 5000 votes cast
at the Convention were recorded as "divided", meaning that
the delegation split its vote evenly," many more must have
fallen short of unanimity. To be sure, the terms "fluid" and
"volatile" apply here as well, but for another reason. In Philadelphia we observe the coming together and breaking up of
five coalitions," rather than the operation of crowd psychology. Coalitions can shift even if individual preferences remain the same.
Consider next the mandate of the assemblies and of the
delegates. Earlier, I noted that there are two sources of out81A. Mathiez, Etude Critique sur les Journdes des 5 & 6 Octobre 1789. Part L 67
REvuE HISORIQUE 41, 269 (1898).
See JILISON, supra note 15. at 4 (quoting FORREST McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE:
THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSrrUION 37 (1958) (-mhirty-one of the thirty-four
maor factions in twelve states were represented by delegates.).
See id. at 208 n.2 (-There were only 146 occasions upon which delegations...
divided their votes evenly.").
See id. at 200 fig.10.1 (illustrating the "[cileavage lines active during the Convention.").
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side authority, one responsible for the convocation of the assembly and the other for the election of delegates. Each of
these creators will predictably try to constrain their creatures, to ensure that certain questions are not raised, or that
certain solutions are chosen. The convener will try to limit
the collective mandate of the assembly, and the electors will
try to limit the individual mandates of the delegates. Equally
predictably, the creature will rebel against the creators and,
as I suggested, the rebel will typically succeed.
Following a distinction made by Talleyrand-P6rigord in the
Assembl6e Constituante,8 we may distinguish between three
kinds of bound mandates: instructions about how to vote on
specific issues, instructions to refuse to debate specific issues, and instructions to withdraw from the assembly in case
certain decisions are made. These are all attempts to bind
individual delegates. In addition, it was argued, both in Paris
and in Philadelphia, that the assembly itself had a limited
mandate, in that certain institutions or issues were out of
bounds for discussion.
In the French assembly, individual mandates were invoked
by way of three instructions: to vote by order or by head, to
refuse consent to a loan before the constitution had been
adopted, and to support the royal veto. On all three counts,
most delegates eventually decided to ignore their instructions.
The main question concerning the collective mandate of the
assembly arose, as I indicated earlier, in the debate over the
royal veto in and over the constitution. For many, it was selfevidently true that the assembly had no mandate to destroy
or limit its creator. For others, it was equally evident that the
assembly could do anything it wanted, being the embodiment
of the will of the nation.
At the Federal Convention, the delegation from Delaware
came with instructions not to accept anything short of equality of votes for all states in the new union. Although the instructions themselves did not amount to more than bound
mandates of the first kind, the threat to withdraw was nevertheless made at the outset of the Convention. "7 Delegates
from the slaveholding states also threatened to withdraw unless they got their way over the slave trade,' but they never
See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2, at 201.
See 3 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 173 (stating that Delaware delegates should
"agree to no system, which should take away from the states that equality of suffrage
secured by the original articles of confederatlon.").
87 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 37 ("[D]eputies from
Delaware were restrained... from assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage ... [or] It might become their duty to retire from the Convention.").
See 2 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 364 ("South Carolina can never receive the plan
85
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referred to any mandate of the first or the third kind.6 The
relevance of this distinction will be further explained later,
suffice it to say here that threats are more credible if backed
by instructions from a superior body.
The Delaware instructions were the only case of individual
mandates at the Federal Convention. Far more important
was the question whether the Convention itself had a mandate to propose sweeping changes in the Constitution. Some
delegates to the Federal Convention claimed that their instructions did not extend to the kind of wide-ranging reform
(They did not, however, threaten to
that was emerging.'
The advocates for a radical
withdraw on this account).
change had two replies. James Wilson said, lamely, that "he
conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at
liberty to propose any thing."9 George Mason argued more
robustly that "[i]n certain seasons of public danger it is commendable to exceed power."9 Randolph, similarly, "was not
scrupulous on the point of power."9 Bootstrap-pulling can be
justified by external circumstances. This kind of statement
was also frequent in the French assembly. The exceptional
conditions that create the call for a constituent assembly also
justify arrogations of power that would appear illegal under
normal circumstances. In the constitution-making process
the kingmaker should beware of the king.
Once the delegates have met, their credentials must be
verified so that the assembly can start working. In Philadelphia, this potentially tricky step caused no problems. The
delegates met, read their credentials, and went on with their
business. In Paris, the verification debates turned out to be a
crucial stage in the self-transformation of the Estates General
Two issues were at stake.
into the National Assembly.9
First, the nobility wanted each order to verify the powers of
its own delegates, whereas the Third Estate wanted the verification to take place in a joint session of all three orders.'
if it prohibits the slave trade.").
89 Two delegates from New York State (Lansing and Yates) actually did withdraw

from the Convention. This, however, did not amount to withdrawal of the New York
delegation.
9o See 1 FARRAND. supra note 1. at 249-50.
9' See d. at 253.
92 See iUL at 346.

See iU. at 255.
After initial plenary sessions, these debates took place in a small committee
with delegates from the three orders. The transcripts from the debates are relatively
full, but do not permit us to identify speakers except by their membership in one of
the orders. See generally PROCI S-VERBAL. supra note 2.
95 See fUi at 39. In this joint session, each delegate would have one vote. A compromise suggested by the clergy, to have the credentials verified in a vote by order.
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(The clergy said from the beginning that they would go along
with any agreement reached by the other two orders.) Second, when the nobility saw that they were not getting their
way, they accepted a proposal that the King be made the arbiter of contested cases. This, too, was unacceptable to the
third estate.
The first issue was to a large extent a red herring. Behind
it was the much more important question of whether the assembly should vote by order or by head. The nobility thought
that a joint verification procedure would create a prejudice in
favor of the vote by head.9 Although the Third Estate strenuously denied this implication 7 and even claimed (not implausibly) that voting by order would make common verification
even more necessary, 5 there is little doubt that they used this
issue to drive in a wedge for the more crucial demand for
voting by head. In fact, the ultimate resolution of the crisis
came when the Third Estate unilaterally transformed itself
into the National Assembly, and invited delegates from the
other orders to join.
Before that happened, however, the committee had examined the compromise proposal to refer contested cases to the
King. The King's commissaries argued' that having called
the Assembly into being, the King also had the right to verify
the credentials of the delegates in cases of disagreement between the orders."° The spokesmen for the Third Estate
clearly recognized the nature of the dilemma. ° On the one
hand, it was unacceptable that the credentials of the assembly should be judged by an external power. In the limit, this
practice might amount to the King selecting the delegates.
On the other hand, self-verification created a vicious circle:
how could the assembly verify the credentials without being
constituted, and how could it be constituted without a prior
verification of the credentials? Their answer to the dilemma
was purely pragmatic: "[1It is impossible to believe that the
majority of those who present themselves as delegates should
not have valid credentials."1°2 In the end, as I said, the Third
so that any two estates could block the credentials of a delegate from the third one,
was not seriously discussed. See id.
See PROCLS-VERBAL, supra note 2, at 8.
97 See id. at 9, 95.
98 See id. at
117.
9 See id. at
87.
100 See id. at 161 (exlpaining that the delegates actually presented this
as a concession because in the last Estates General in 1614 the King had the right to decide
in cases of disagreement within each order).
01 See PROCMS-VERBAL, supra note 2, at 75, 86-87.
102 See PROCJ S-VERBAL, supra note 2, at 86-87.
Even admitting this premise, the
dilemma persists. Assume that the assembly has 100 delegates, that three of the
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Estate cut the Gordian knot by simply declaring itself constituted.
The next aspect of the constitution of the constituent assembly concerns its internal procedural rules. The following
issues can arise. The assembly may set a time limit for its
proceedings. If it also serves as legislative assembly, it must
decide on the allocation of its time between law-making and
constitution-making. It may decide to create one or several
subcommittees to prepare a draft of the constitution or to
discuss special issues. It must decide whether to proceed in
closed sessions or open the debates to the public. If the sessions are closed, it must decide whether to inform the public
about the proceedings or keep them secret It must decide on
the quorum, on the method of voting (by roll call, show of
hands, etc.), and on the procedure for transforming votes into
decisions.
The effect of such procedural rules can be profound for
several reasons. As we know from social choice theory, the
process of aggregating given preferences into a final decision
is deeply affected by procedural rules. Also, the setting of the
debates may affect those preferences themselves, or at least
the preferences that the delegates choose to express. In sum,
procedure affects the transformation, expression and aggregation of preferences in ways that can be crucial for the final
outcome. Here I shall survey some aspects of preference aggregation. The impact of the setting on the transformation of
preferences is discussed in Part IV. The impact on the expression of preferences is analyzed in Part VI.
In both countries, the assembly had to come to grips with
the fact of a preexisting partition of the nation into groups of
unequal size. In America these groups were geographically
defined states, whereas in France they were socially defined
orders. In both cases, the question arose whether the assembly should proceed on the principle "one man, one vote"
or "one group, one vote." (In Philadelphia the question arose
not only for the constituent assembly itself, but also- and
mainly--for future legislatures.) The question was, as we
shall see, resolved differently in the two countries.
In the Assembl6e Constituante, the burning issue was
whether the estates would vote by order or by head. Necker
failed in his attempt to constrain the assembly on this point.
"He asserted categorically that the traditional method of decredentials are contested, and that the uncontested delegates are divided 49-48 over
the validity of the contested credentials. If in the vote over one contested case. the
other contested cases vote with the minority, the contested credentials will be approved.
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liberation and vote by order could not be changed except by
the agreement of each of the three orders and the approval of
the king.""° When the assembly met, however, the Third Estate unilaterally imposed common deliberation and voting by
head, using, as I said, the debate over the verification of credentials as a wedge. This outcome, to be sure, was clearly
the result Necker intended. Doubling the votes of the Third
Estate would make little difference and little sense if the voting were to be by order. He had hoped, however, that it
would be reached by compromise and negotiation. To that
end, he fought, unsuccessfully, against electoral assemblies
that instructed their delegates to vote for or against voting by
head.
Voting in the Convention was by majority vote, each state
having one vote. Although the Pennsylvanians wanted to refuse the smaller states an equal vote, their proposal was never
put on the table1 °4 When a committee was formed to forge a
compromise on the upper house, James Wilson "objected to
the Committee, because it would decide according to that
very rule of voting which was opposed on one side,"05 but to
no avail. Yet equality of votes at the Convention could not in
itself ensure that the outcome would be equal representation
in the Senate, as decisions were taken by majority vote
among the states and the small states formed a minority.
The large states failed, but not because the rules of voting in
the Convention made equal representation a foregone conclusion. Later, I discuss other possible explanations for their
failure.
The American case, on closer inspection, involves three
stages. In the first stage we have the convocation of the assembly by Congress. In the second stage we have the adoption of a voting procedure to be used at the Convention. In
the third stage we have the adoption of a voting procedure for
the future Senate. In all three stages, the principle "one state,
one vote" was followed. It is tempting to read a causal connection into this fact. The Convention adopted the principle
for its own proceedings because it was used by the institution
that had created it. Further, it proposed the principle for the
future because the smaller states at the Convention benefited
from the disproportionate strength they derived from its use
at that stage. As I said, the principle cannot by itself explain
See HARRIS, supra note 15. at 326.
See 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 10 n.* (stating that members from Virginia
feared that there would be fatal altercations between small and large states, and that
for this, as well as other reasons, they "discountenanced [and] stifled the project.").
105 See Udat 515.
103
104
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the final decision of having equal representation in the Senate, but it may have been a contributing, perhaps even pivotal, factor.
There are two mechanisms that could be at work here. On
the one hand, there is the sheer force of precedence. As
Samuel Patterson asked at the Convention, "[ilf a propor-m
tional representation be right, why do we not vote so here?"'
On the other hand, the equality of votes at the Convention increased the voting power of the small states. Since the small
states were in a minority, this could not by itself ensure their
victory. The voting procedure at the Convention, however, increased their bargaining power for logrolling purposes.
Whatever the mechanism, we observe a deep continuity in the
American proceedings. The Articles of Confederation shaped
the Convention. Through the Convention, they also shaped
the Constitution that was finally adopted. The French assembly made a much cleaner break with the pasL Once the
Third Estate had obtained the vote by head, there was nothing to stop them. 0 7
The final decision I shall discuss concerns the mode of
ratification of the constitution. This act is intended to confer
downstream legitimacy on the constitution, to be distinguished from the upstream legitimacy derived from the
authorities that call the assembly into being. Whereas ordinary laws need no legitimacy beyond that of having been
adopted by a lawfully elected assembly, the constitution may
seem to require a second scrutiny. For one thing, the constitution regulates the most basic aspects of political life. For
another, it is deliberately constructed so as to be difficult to
change. For both reasons, one might want to have an opportunity to overrule the decision of the constituent assembly
itself. Moreover, the knowledge of that possibility will keep
the framers within bounds. Not wanting to be overruled, they
will anticipate and feel constrained by the possible censure.
It would seem axiomatic that the authorities that call the
constituent assembly into being would also want the right to
veto the final document. However, the framers themselves
might not accept the authority of their creator, especially if
they have already gone beyond their mandate. Instead, they
might define themselves as the final and sovereign authority,
doing away with any need for ratification. Alternatively, they
See 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 250.
The question of continuity versus discontinuity must be distinguished from the
question of respecting versus violating upstream instructions. The Impact of the
past on the present may actually be less effective when it takes the form of explicit
instructions than when it is channeled through the focal-point quality of the past.
106
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might appeal directly to the people or to special conventions.
These are the outcomes that were observed in, respectively,
the French and the American cases.
In France, the right of the King to veto the constitution
was a thorny issue, especially in the wake of the decree of
August 4 1789 that abolished all feudal dues. As the King
hesitated to give his sanction to the decree, the question
arose whether his assent was needed at all. Both the King
and the assembly tended to see the other as its creature, invested with powers only through its actions. Mounier argued
that since the King had created the assembly, he must also
have the right to veto its decision. °8 In reply, Target argued
that a royal veto over the constitution would be absurd, as if
"the constituent N ower had to ask the permission of the constituted power."' When the issue came up again in the last
days of the assembly, the King was left formally free to refuse
the constitution."0 Although some of his advisers urged him
to strike a bargain, he opted for unconditional acceptance.11 '
It is fair to say that by that time- after the flight to Varennes
that undermined his authority- he had no other choice.
Reading the debates, it is clear that they did not take place
under the shadow of future ratification.
That shadow, by contrast, was very much present at the
Federal Convention. Although no ratification procedure was
laid down in the convocation of the Convention, many assumed that the Constitution would eventually have to be
ratified by the state legislatures. Reasoning from that premise, they argued that the Constitution ought to be tailored so
as to be acceptable to those bodies. Charles Pinkney asserted, for instance, that "the Legislatures would be less likely
to promote the adoption of the new Government, if they were
to be excluded from all share in it.""2

Ellsworth argued in

similar terms that "[i]f we are jealous of the State [Governments], they will be so of us."" The Constitution would not
receive their approval "[i]f on going home I tell them we gave
the [General Government] such powers because we could not
trust you."" 4 Others turned the argument on its head: if the
state legislatures had an institutional interest in the outcome,
they ought not to be judge in their own cause. Rufus King,
08 See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES. supranote 2, at 587.
109

See icL at 603.

110 See 30 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAiRES, supra note 2. at 127-45.

III See NORMAN HAMPSON, PRELUDE TO TERROR 77-78
(1988).
had been struck earlier. See tnfra Part V.
112 1 FARRAND, supra
note 1, at 132.
13 Id. at 374.
114 Id.

Actually, a bargain

Mar. 20001

TWO CONS7TUENTASSEMBLES

for instance, argued for ratification by special conventions on
being to lose power,
the grounds that "itihe Legislatures also
1 s In the end, the latter
objections."
raise
to
likely
will be most
view was adopted. The Convention decided that the Constitution had to be approved by conventions in nine of the thirteen states. This procedure involved a double break with the
Articles of Confederation, which demanded unanimous ratification by the state legislatures for all alterations.
Later I shall have more to say about the nature and
strength of the constraints that the need for ratification
placed on the debates at the Convention. In particular, I
shall emphasize that the institutional interests of the legislatures was not their only or even their main concern. Much
more important was the need to accommodate the material
interests of the states, an issue that would have come up regardless of the mode of state ratification. This downstream
concern is closely linked to the upstream obligation of the
delegates to represent the interests of their constituencies.
There is however, the following difference. Whereas delegates
from all states are concerned about the ratification by any
given state, only the delegates from that state have an obligation to represent its interests. The shared concern provides
grounds for rational argument. The partisan interest, by
contrast, yields only raw material for strategic bargaining.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUING

Delegates to constituent assemblies usually do not take up
arms against each other. Their aim is to reach agreement by
talk, not victory by fight. Yet there are many kinds of talk.
speech acts, I
many types of speech acts. Constitutional
and bargaining.1 'O
shall argue, are of two basic types: arguing
15

Id. at 123.

A third type of speech acts, rhetoricalstatements aiming at persuasion. are also
important in assembly discussions. See CH. PERELiAN. THE NEW RHETORic AND THE
HuMANMTES (William Kluback trans., D. Reldel Publishing Company 1979). For an
application to constitutional debates, see Evelyn Carol Fink. Political Rhetoric and
Strategic Choice in the Ratification Conventions on the U.S. Constitution (1987] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester) (on Me with the Harvard University Library). I am uncertain about the proper analytical characterization of such
techniques. Later. I distinguish among reason, passion and interest as motives of
speakers in constitutional or legislative assemblies. See Infra. Part IV. Applying the
same distinction to the motives imputed by the speakers to their audience, rhetoric
may perhaps be defined by the feature that its practitioners appeal to the passions of
their audience rather than to their reason or self-interest. The question needs much
further exploration. In some debates, reason speaks to reason: in others, interest to
interest; in still others, passion to passion. But other constellations also occur.
Moreover, constitutional debates usually involve a third party. i.e.. the future generations for whom the constitution is written. Hence. a typical constitutional speech
116
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Rational argumentation on the one hand, threats and promises on the other, are the main vehicles by which the parties
seek to reach agreement. The former is subject to criteria of
validity, the latter to criteria of credibility. Although my claim
extends beyond constituent assemblies to ordinary legislatures and committees, I derive my examples from the two
eighteenth century assemblies.
Reaching agreement is not the only way of making decisions. In theory, the delegates could just get together, cast
their votes, record the majority outcome, and then disperse,
without any communication. This, in fact, was Rousseau's
ideal of political decision-making. Communication among the
voters, he thought, invited rhetoric and demagogy. By contrast, "[ijf, when the people, being furnished with adequate
information, held its deliberations, the citizens had no communication one with another, the grand total of the small
differences would always give the general will.... "117 This
view is hard to take seriously, because of the implausible
premise that the citizens could obtain information without
communicating with each other. In theory, communication
may not be a necessary part of collective decision-making. In
practice, however, we cannot imagine the latter without the
former.
I need not assume, however, that communication is sufficient for a decision to be made. Bargaining may lead to an
impasse, e.g. if the parties verbally precommit themselves to
incompatible positions. In addition, arguments may fail to
yield a decision, even when supplemented by voting, e.g. if
only 60% of eligible voters support a proposal that requires a
two-thirds majority to be adopted. Even in such cases, however, communication may partly explain why no decision was
made. And when a decision is reached, communication may
be part of the explanation of why that decision, rather than
another, was made.
My analysis in this Part relies on recent work by Habermas. He argues that a speaker who aims at achieving understanding rather than success is committed to three validity
claims: propositional truth, normative rightness, and truth-

act is one in which an orator (speaking from specific motives) addresses an audience
(whom he assumes to have specific motives) about the proper institutional response
to the specific motives he imputes to future legislators. In this Article, I touch only
on some of the possible combinations.
17 JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu. THE SocIAL
CoNrRAcr AND DiscouRsES 27 (G.D.H. Cole
trans., E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc. 1950) (1762); see also Bernard Manin. Volontd gdndrale ou dalibdration?EsquLsse d' une thdorte de la ddllbdrationpolUtque, 33
LE D9BAT 72 (1985).
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fulness."8 It follows that a speaker who wants to appearas
aiming at understanding must also appear to be committed to
these claims. In Part VI, therefore, I shall discuss the conditions under which a speaker who is really aiming at success
will find it in his interest to appear to be aiming at understanding. In this Part, however, I consistently take appearances at face value.
The idea that a speaker who makes factual claims is committed to propositional truth is hardly controversial. Nor can
it be disputed that many debates in assemblies, conventions
and legislatures are directed to purely factual matters. In
principle, such debates are constrained by the normal rules
of scientific argument. At the Federal Convention, in particular, many delegates saw themselves as political scientists,
concerned with tracing causal connections between institutions and outcomes. Illustrative examples are cited below.
The idea of normative rightness is difficult and controversial. First, let us distinguish between individual rationality
and social justice. Both are normative conceptions that lend
themselves to disagreement and, I think, argument. For instance, framers may have identical (e.g. utilitarian) values
and identical factual beliefs and yet disagree over what
should be done if they differ n their degree of risk-aversion,
their rate of time discounting, or their more or less pessimistic approaches to decision-making under uncertainty. Although some claim that such differences are brute tastes that
do not lend themselves to rational discussion, I believe a case
can be made for the opposite view. Here, however, I leave
these issues on the side.
Many authors claim that normative rightness, understood
as social justice, must involve some minimal idea of impartialityj."' This is also the idea I shall be exploring in the following. The texts, however, do not always lend themselves to
this reading. In the committee debates over the verification of
credentials in the Assembl~e Constituante, appeals to precedent were frequent, and regularly opposed to the giving of
reasons. On one occasion, precedent was evoked merely as a
tie-breaker.' 2 Because there were (impartial) reasons on both
sides, one should follow the procedures adopted in 1614. The
nobility tended, however, to offer precedent as a decisive consideration, although they also went out of their way to show
that their proposal was (uniquely) supported by reason. The
118

See 1 HABERMIAS. supra note 7, at 75; Habermas, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS. supra

note 7, at 58.
AS IMPmArry (1995).
"9 See, e.g.. BRIAN BARRY. JUSTICE
120 See PROCks-VERBAL, supranote 2. at 22.
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opposite characterization applies to the Third Estate. The
striking fact, for my purposes, is that nobody offered an impartialargumentfor the appeal to precedent, or suggested that
precedent could itself be a reason. What has been called the
"normative power of the factual" was, somehow,
just taken for
granted. Again, I cannot deal with this issue in the detail it
would deserve.
The ideal of impartiality asserts that people should not be
treated differently simply because they live at a particular
time and place or belong to a particular sex, race or profession. Any differential treatment of such groups must be
grounded in properties that could in principle apply to anyone. It was precisely at the time of the two assemblies that
these ideas of impartiality and universality became generally
recognized as the basis for political life. In the French assembly, they were memorably expressed in ClermontTonnerre's plea for recognizing Jews, actors and executioners
as full citizens.' 2 ' The refusal of the right to vote for women
might appear to be an exception. In Sieyes' argument, however, the refusal was grounded in women's lack of a universal
property, namely that of "contributing to the public estabtm
lishment."'
In fact, those who argued against full citizenship
for Jews similarly referred to their lack of a universal property, namely that of doing military service. ' 2 Nobody claimed
that Jews had to be excluded simply because of their race.
As these examples show, this notion of impartiality is indeed
a minimal one. For the present purposes, however, I shall
not try to go beyond it.'24
Prejudice is one antonym of impartiality. Selfishness is
another.
However, one need not always oppose impartiality
and self-interest. Instead, one may offer an argument from
self-interest for impartiality. This is the structure of a veil-ofignorance argument that was used repeatedly at the Federal
121 See 10 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES,
supranote
122 1 Orateurs, supra note 2, at 1014.
1
12
125

2, at 754.

See 10 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTIRES, supranote
2, at 757.
See infra note 145 and accompanying text for further discussion
of impartiality.
See infra note 146 and accompanying text for a more general discussion
of In-

terest, reason and passion (which includes, but is not limited to, prejudice). I take
this occasion to indicate that references here and below to self-interest must be understood in a wide sense that also includes the interest of the group to which the
speaker belongs, as long as that group is a proper subset of society as a whole.
When an actor seeks to promote group interest he may do so out of (narrowly construed) self-interest, because the group will penalize him If he fails to do so, but he
may also act out of genuine identification with the group. For my purposes this distinction is immaterial. However, it is important that both these cases differ from that
in which group interest is a constraint on the actor rather than a maximand. See
infra note 195 and accompanying text for further discussion of self-interested behavior.
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Convention, most strikingly in Madison's account of an intervention by George Mason:
We ought to attend to the rights of every class of... people. He
had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of
society to this dictate of humanity & policy, considering that
however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but
certainly would, distribute their posteriority throughout the lowest classes of Society. Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as
would provide no less carefully for the rights... and happiness
of Citizens.1
of the lowest than of the highest orders

Veil-of-ignorance arguments'27 were also used in other
contexts. Thus Gouverneur Morris argued that
State attachments, and State importance have been the bane of
this Country. We cannot annihilate: but we may perhaps take
out the teeth of the serpents. He wished our ideas to be enlarged
to the true interest of man, instead of being circumscribed within
the narrow compass of a particular Spot. And after all how little
can be the motive yielded by selfishness for such a policy. Who
can say whether he himself, much less whether his children, will
the next year be an inhabitant of this or that State.12

This argument refers to the thirteen states then in existence,
but it was also used to cover the accession of future states.
Against Gerry's proposal to "limit the number of new States to
be admitted into the Union, in such a manner, that they
should never be able to outnumber the Atlantic States,"'
Sherman replied that "[wle are providing for our posterity, for
our children [and] our grand [clhildren, who would be as
likely to be citizens of new Western States as of the old
These arguments should not be confused with
States. " ' 3
genuine appeals to impartiality, as in Mason's argument for
granting new states equal status:
Strong objections had been drawn from the danger to the Atlantic interests from new Western States. Ought we to sacrifice
what we know to be right in itself, lest it should prove favorable
to States which are not yet in existence. If the Western States
are to be admitted into the Union as they arise, they must, he
[would] repeat, be treated as equals, and subjected to no degrading discriminations.'
1 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 49.
The arguments invoke a real veil of Ignorance, not the hypothetical veil that Is
used to define "the original position" in JOHN RAWLS. THEORY OF JUSTICE 12. 19. 138
(1971).
128 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 530-31.
1
2 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 3.
130 Id.
131 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 578-79.
127
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As a further instance of a genuine impartial argument, I
shall cite what in my opinion was the intellectual high point
at the Federal Convention: Madison's argument that an upper house serves
first to protect the people agst. their rulers: secondly to protect
(the people) agst. the transient impressions into which they
themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate
moment, and with the experience of other nations before them,
on the plan of Govt. most likely to secure their happiness, would
first be aware, that those chargd. with the public happiness,
might betray their trust. An obvious precaution agst. this danger wd. be to divide the trust between different bodies of men,
who might watch & check each other ....
It wd. next occur to
such a people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of information as to their true interest, and that
men chosen for a short term, & employed but a small portion of
that in public affairs, might err from the same cause ....
Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion,
wd. be that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were liable to err also, from fickleness and passion ....

It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating on a

Govt. for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result
from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might
under sudden impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the
132
minority.13

The argument is very much like that usually adduced for
stringent amendment clauses. Deliberating in a temperate
moment, a people might anticipate that on certain occasions
in the future it might be less temperate, and so create an institutional machinery that would be an obstacle to sudden

impulses and passions. Madison is not implying that the
Convention incarnated the people in a deliberate moment. As

is clear from the wording of his argument, he is constructing
an original position occupied by rational, temperate agents
who have to create an institutional response to certain facts
about human nature. "
132 Id.

at 421-22.
one may also detect an element of hypocrisy, see WOOD, supranote 15, at
562, in assertions like Madison's statement that "Idiemocratic communites may be
unsteady, and be led to action by the impulse of the moment.- Like individuals they
may be sensible of their own weakness, and may desire the counsels and checks of
friends to guard them against the turbulency and violence of unruly passions." 1
FARRAND, supra note 1. at 430-31 (emphasis added). The Senate embodied the desire of the upper class to protect itself against the lower class- not the desire of the
people to protect itself against itself. However, the two views are not incompatible.
On similar grounds it has been argued that "[a] majority groups, say, the workers,
who control the policy might rationally choose to have a constitution which limits
their power, say, to expropriate the wealth of the capitalist class." Finn E. Kydland
& Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion The Inconsistency of Optional
Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 486 (1977). Moreover, even in the absence of an ex133 True,
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Finally, the pursuit of understanding is also constrained
by a commitment to truthfulness or sincerity, that is, meaning what one says. As Habermas notes, the outward form of
truthfulness is consistency. 3 A participant who is seen as
choosing normative arguments A la carte, and discarding
them whenever they work against him, will often be viewed as
However, change of mind need not be a sign of
insincere."
opportunism. People often modify their views by exposure to
an argument. Indeed, as I show below, framers in both assemblies believed that a major virtue of rational deliberation
was that of allowing this to happen. Nevertheless, genuine
changes of mind can often be distinguished from opportunism. Explicit disavowal of one's earlier views, and attempts to
remedy earlier decisions, would be one criterion. Claiming to
be persuaded by normative arguments that are counter to
one's self-interest would be another. Although neither criterion is infallible, both can be helpful.
In the committee proceedings on the verification of credentials in the Assembl~e Constituante, charges of inconsistency played a major role in the attacks of the Third Estate on
the nobility's argument from precedent. In arguing for separate verification for each order, the nobility appealed to the
precedent of the Estates General of 1614. The Third Estate
countered by pointing to several other features from that occasion that the nobility did not want to preserve, telling them
in effect that they could not have it both ways.1 The pattern
is: if you claim A, you must also admit B. When the nobility
went beyond the immediate precedent of 1614 to the Estates
of 1588, the Third Estate countered by going even further
back, to 1483.137The pattern is: if you claim A, you must allow
us to claim B.
In the Assembl~e Constituante itself, the mercurial Mirabeau lent himself especially well to the charge of inconsistency. On some occasions he argued that the King was superior to the assembly and on others that the assembly was
sovereign;" = in some debates he claimed that bound mandates could be ignored and in others that they had to be replicit choice, one may argue that this is what rational workers and rational members
of the lower class would choose in the original position. Obviously. one has to be
careful in assessing such arguments, for the reasons explained in Part VI Lnfra. But
they cannot be dismissed out of hand.
See 1 HABERAS, supra note 7. at 303; HABERMS. MORAL CONSCIOUS.MSS. supra
note
7, at 59.
3
1 5 See infraPart IV.
136 See PROCtS-VERBAL, supranote 2. at 10, 31. 79-80. 201.
137 See PROCks-VERBAL, supra note 2. at 13. 29.
13

For this charge, see 1 ORATEURS. supranote 2. at 945.
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spected.'3 9
On one occasion Mirabeau's arch-reactionary
younger brother perfidiously used his own words from an
earlier occasion against him. 40 His erratic behavior may have
nurtured the suspicion, later proved to be correct, that he
was in the pay of the King. Yet his inconsistencies did not
prevent him from having an enormous influence in the Assembly.14 ' At the Federal Convention Madison142 and George
Mason' 3 made charges of inconsistency against, respectively,
Gouvemeur Morris and James Wilson, accusing them of vacillating between confidence and distrust in their attitude toward future legislatures. To be sure, such accusations are
not always made in good faith. The contexts in which the allegedly inconsistent statements are made may be so different
that no real contradiction exists. Yet to the extent that they
are perceived as valid, their effect can be devastating.
In constitutional debates, as elsewhere, arguments tend to
be either consequentialist or deontological. Roughly speaking, the framers appealed to overall efficiency or to individual
rights. This is what Madison does in The FederalistNo.10,
for instance, when he refers to "the rights of another or the
good of the whole" as the two values that have to be preserved
from the corrupting influence of factions.'" In the constituent assemblies, speakers made constant references to these
two values.
Both respect the constraint of impartiality.
Rights-based arguments are impartial because (and to the
extent that) the rights are assigned to everybody, either unconditionally or conditionally upon some performance accessible to all. It would be a violation of impartiality, for instance, if women were denied the right to vote on the grounds
that they do not perform military service, while also being
disallowed to do so. It is not, or not in an equally obvious
sense, a violation of impartiality if only tax-payers are allowed
to vote, assuming that everybody is allowed to have gainful
employment. 4 5 Many arguments based on the public good
139
140

See HARRIS, supranote 15, at 633.
Compare 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2, at 213, with 9 ARCHIVES

PARLEMENTAIRES, supranote 2, at 383.
141 Rhetoric, as distinct from argument, may have been
at work here. See supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
142 See 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at, 584.
143 See2 FARRAND, supranote 1, at, 31.
144 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
145 The previous statements assume that "accessibility" means the absence of legal
obstacles. Of course, earning an income Is also inaccessible for many of the severely
handicapped, regardless of their freedom to seek gainful employment. Today, such
handicaps would not constitute grounds for the denial of voting rights. Some conditional rights remain even today, however, such as the registration requirement for
voters. In this Article, as I said, I am concerned with a minimal notion of Impartiality
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are also impartial, notably those which rely on some version
of utilitarianism. "Each to count for one and nobody for more
than one" is a clear statement of the impartial ideal.
It is important to my thesis in Part VI that there are many
ways of spelling out the ideal of impartiality. Arguments from
rights and from the public good can take many different
forms. Rights can be imputed to individuals or to collectivities, and yield radically different conclusions in the two applications. Utilitarianism can be explicated in ways that allow or prohibit interpersonal comparisons of utility. Norms of
distribution according to need, desert or contribution are impartial, as are norms of equal distribution or distribution by
lot. The idea that social arrangements ought to reflect what
rational individuals would choose behind a veil of uncertainty
(a notion that can be spelled out in several different ways)
also reflects an ideal of impartiality. In this Part, however, I
shall limit myself to rights-based arguments and arguments
from the common good.
I begin with (and shall have most to say about) consequentialist arguments, based on some conception of efficiency, the public interest or the common good. While assuming that framers are motivated by these impartial
concerns, I shall discuss different assumptions which they
can make about the future generations of voters, politicians,46
and administrators for whom the constitution is made.'
These assumptions fall into three categories. Future generations can be assumed to be motivated by passion, by interest
or, like the framers themselves, by impartial reason. , In the
that excludes only rights that are legally inaccessible (directly or indirectly. through
unfufillable requirements) to a subset of the population.
146 For a fuller discussion, see Jon Elster, Lmtting Majority Rule:
Alternatives to
Judicial Review in the Revolutionary Epoch, In CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD
CONSTTTONS 3-21 (E. Smith ed., 1995).
147 For a general discussion of this trio of motives. see JON ELSTER. ALCHIIEIES OF
THE MIND 332-402 (1999) [hereinafter ELSTER, ALCHEMIESj (arguing that the motiva-

tions behind people's actions can be ranked in terms of how acceptable they are to
the actor or to other people). For references by the American founders, see MORTON
WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITITON 102 (1987]. For a discus-

sion in a different constitutional setting, see REG WHrrAKER. Reason. Passionand Interest: PierreTrudeau's EternalLiberalTriangle, In A SOVEREIGN IDEA 132-164 (1992).
More frequently, the Ideas are opposed to each other in pairwise fashion. David
Hume, when addressing the relation between passion and reason, argued that the
latter was, and ought only to be, the slave of the former. See DAVID HUm. A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, 415 (L.

Selby-Bigge ed.. 2d ed. 1978).

Roughly

speaking, he meant that there could be no rational deliberation about ends, only
about means. Albert Hirschman has considered the changing attitudes towards
passions and interests in the eighteenth century, arguing that the dominance of interest over passion in a commercial society constituted "a political argument for
capitalism before its triumph."
INTERESTS:

ALBERT 0.

HIRSCHMAN. THE PASSIONS AND THE

POITICALARGUMENTS FOR CAPrrAuLSM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977.

In many
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third case, I emphasize that the framers can try to promote
impartial argument, whereas in the first two cases their task
is mainly one of damage-limitation with respect to given motives. Institutions, that is, can be designed either to encourage virtue or to contain vice. In Parts V and VI, I entertain
the idea that the framers themselves may be swayed by one of
the first two motives. Even in this Part, however, I give some
concessions to the human frailty of the founding generation,
by discussing the case of imperfectly rationalframers.
First, the constitution-making process can be viewed as
one in which rational, impartial framers try to contain the
passions of future generations. This idea has two aspects
which are related, respectively, to the machinery of constitutional amendment and the ordinary machinery of legislation.
By making it hard to amend the constitution, framers can restrain passionate majorities who might want to suppress the
rights of minorities. By slowing down the ordinary legislative
process, through bicameralism and executive veto, the constitution can reduce the dangers of reckless and fickle majority legislation. Madison's argument, cited above, that the
Senate is needed to protect the people against its predictable
"fickleness and passion" falls into this category.
By and large, the records from the Federal Convention give
little evidence that the Framers were concerned with the passions of future generations. They were much more concerned
with future generations' tendency to pursue myopic or partisan interests.' 48 The Framers assumed, by and large, that
motives are always and everywhere self-interested. This assumption was probably adopted for prudential reasons, and
not because it was believed to be literally true. According to
Hume, "[ilt is... a just political maxim, that every man must
be supposed to be a knave; though, at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics which is false in fact."149 Steeped as they were in Humean
thinking, the Framers naturally adopted the same outlook."
In the Assembl~e Constituante, the assumptions made
discussions of the debates at the Federal Convention, reason and interest are believed to exhaust the motives of the Framers. See JILLSON, supra note 15, at 193-94
(citing Madison, Hamilton and Tocqueville to the same effect); see also Jack N.
Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of Constitution
Making, 44WM. & MARY Q. 424 (1987).
148 Myopic attitudes form a borderline case between interests and
passions. An
agent's interest, as perceived by himself, may well involve some discounting of the
future. Going against one's own well-considered judgment because of a sudden impulse would, however, be a case of interest yielding to passion.
149 DAVID HUME, ESSAYS: MORAL, POLICAL
AND LrrERARY 42 (1963).
IO For the influence of Hume on the Framers, see generally WHITE. supranote 147,
at 13-22, 87-88, 187-88.
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about human nature were both nastier and loftier than the
ones adopted at the Federal Convention. Although Hume's
assumption of universal knavishness is often thought to represent a worst-case scenario, there are worse things than
self-interest.'51 Foremost among them are envy, spite, pride
and vanity. Although there were a couple of arguments at the
Federal Convention that may be read as if the Framers imputed envy on those for whom they were legislating,'o the
passages are ambiguous and atypical. In the Assemblde
Constituante, however, arguments from pride and vanity,
amour-propre, played a considerable role. Twenty-five years
later, Benjamin Constant remained concerned with "the
problem of... amour-propre,a peculiarly French flaw,"'o and
argued that "institutional devices" were needed to counter
it." He advocated, for instance, for the British system that
forbade written speeches in Parliament ' s Tocqueville, too,
constantly emphasized this character trait of the French, explaining how as the Foreign Minister of Louis Napoleon he got
his way by flattering the amour-propreof his opponents while
riding rough-shod over their interests.'5
In the Assembl~e Constituante, Bergasse repeatedly argued the need to accommodate the vanity or pride of the
agents whose behavior will be regulated by the constitution. 5' 7
The prosecutor, he says, should not also serve as judge, because if the functions are combined, the amour-propreof the
magistrate might bias him towards the guilt of the accused.'"
If the legislature accuses a minister of misconduct, he should
not be judged by an ordinary court, as it might make this an
occasion to "humiliate the pride" of the legislative body.'o A
suspensive veto for the King will not have the intended effect
of making the assembly reconsider, because its amour-propre
will prevent it from backing down.' 6° Malouet discussed a
similar argument that had been advanced against the proSee generally ALBERr 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESYS (1977);
Stephen Holmes, The Secret History of Self-Interest, In BEYOND SEF2-INTEREST 267
(JaneJ. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
152 See 1 FARRAND. supranote 1. at 176.
153 STEPHEN HOLIMES, BENJAIN CONSTANT AND THE MAtiNG OF MODERN LIBERALISM
139 (1984).
154 See id. at 140.
155 Id. at 140 (noting that the British rule was meant to create a "majorit6 silen151

cieuse" in the Assembly and thus force politicians to 'take refuge in reason as a last

resort").
" SeeTOCQUEVILLE, RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 43. at 233.
See 9 ARcHIVES PARLEwMETAIRES, supra note 2. at 115.
See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEENTAIRES, supra note 2. at 443.
159 See 9 ARcHIvES PARLFENTAIRES, supranote 2. at 111.
ISOSee ici. at 116.
157
158
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posal to give a veto to the senate which could only be overruled by a two thirds majority in the lower house. 6 ' In his
reply, Malouet did not deny the operation of amour-propre,

but argued that it would be limited to those who had initiated
the6 2 law, and would not extend to everybody who voted for
it.

A subtle instance of such reasoning arose over the duration of the suspensive veto of the King. Could the next legislature overrule him, or could the veto be repeated until a
third legislature? In his letter to the assembly, Necker argued
that the King's right to two consecutive vetoes was essential,
as it allowed him to yield to the assembly's wishes in the second legislature without appearing to be forced to do so."

Only in this way could the King's dignity and majesty, according to Necker, be upheld. Arguing for the same proposal
(which was eventually adopted), Clermont-Tonnerre also referred to the need to conserve the royal dignity." Although
dignity is hardly the same as amour-propre,they belong to the
same family of motives. It is hard to imagine a similar argument being made about the presidency at the Federal Convention.
Second, the process can be viewed as the framers trying to
control and harness the self-interest of future legislators.
Public choice theory was well represented at the Federal Convention, where the Framers constantly based their arguments
on the incentive effects of various schemes. Let me cite three
examples, all from Madison.
Madison was worried about requiring landed property for
members of Congress. Looking back, he observed that "[it
had often happened that men who had acquired landed property on credit, got into the Legislatures with a view of promoting an unjust protection agst. their Creditors."'0 Another
instance of incentive-effect reasoning occurred in his comments on a proposal that in voting for the president, each
elector should have two votes, at least one of which should be
cast for a candidate not from his own state. Madison
161

16

See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2, at 591.

See iL

See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2, at 612. An alliance between the
partisans of an absolute veto and the patriots who disliked any ministerial interference blocked the reading of the letter to the assembly.
See JEAN EGRET, LA
RPVOLUTION DES NOTABLES, supra note 15, at 154-55. Necker's preference ranking
was (i) suspensive veto for two periods, (i) absolute veto and (iW)suspensive veto for
one period. Neither (ii) nor (iiW)would ever be used (although for different reasons),
but (ii) would at least leave the King with the appearance of majesty. See 8 ARCHIVES
PARLEMENTAIRFS, supra note 2, at 615.
IC See 9 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES,
supranote 2, at 59.
1
2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 123.
IM
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thought something valuable might be made of the suggestion .... The only objection which occurred was that each Citizen after havg. given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen wd.
throw away his second on some obscure Citizen of another State.
in order to ensure the object of his first choice."'1
A final argument is less convincing. Arguing against selection of the executive by the legislature, Madison asserted
that "the candidate would intrigue with the Legislature,
would derive his appointment from the predominant faction,
and be apt to render his administration subservient to its
views."' 67 But it is not clear that a candidate's promise to favor his electors would be credible. Unless the executive can
stand for reelection, one would expect the legislature to become subservient to its creature." The kingmaker, in fact,
should beware of the king.'6
The last example raises a more general issue. As we shall
see in Part V, constitutional bargaining turns crucially on the
credibility of threats and promises. In legislating impartially
for the future, constitution-makers might also take account of
the possibility of threat-based bargaining in later legislatures,
and discourage or encourage it by acting on the elements that
lend credibility to the threats.'Y° At the Federal Convention,
Gouverneur Morris applied such reasoning on two occasions.
First, arguing against the proposal that all bills for raising
money should originate in the first branch, he referred to the
following scenario: "[sluppose an enemy at the door, and
money instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling him,
may not the popular branch avail itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the Senate destructive of the Constitution itself?"17 ' The argument is dubious because the threat of
SId. at 114.
Id. at 109.
This was apparently the typical outcome in the power struggles between the
'
Roman Senate and the Emperor it elected. See PAUL VEYE. LE PAIN ET LE CIRQUE 714
(1976). Although the elected Polish kings were more tightly constrained, they were
bound not by electoral promises (except for the election in 1576) but by standing
16

68

constitutional rules.

1 NORMAN DAVIES, GOD'S PLAYGROUND:

A HISTORY OF POLAND

331 (1982) (explaining how the Pacta Conventaserved as the "ultimate check on the
conduct of the king").
169This is not to deny that the executive will tend to be weaker If elected by the
legislature than if chosen by popular balloL For one thing, the legislature may deliberately choose a weak candidate. Alternatively, a popularly elected executive will
enjoy greater legitimacy on which he can draw in his power struggles with the legislature.
170 This might be a reason, for example, to keep the right to secession out of the
constitution in federally organized states. See Cass R. Sunstein. Constitutionalism
and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 647-48 (1991) (noting that one drawback to
the right to secession is that subunits of a nation could always use the threat of seagendas).
cession to push their particular
171 1 FARRAND, supru note 1. at 545.
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the popular branch to withhold money would hardly be
credible. On a later occasion a proposal was made to have a
census at regular intervals for the purposes of adjusting representation. According to Madison's notes, "Mr. Govr. Morris
opposed it as fettering the Legislature too much. Advantage
may be taken of in time of war or the apprehension of it, by
new States to extort particular favors."'7 2 This argument also
seems implausible, for similar reasons.
The argument that the assembly could derive bargaining
clout from its power to withhold taxes was also discussed in
the Assemblae Constituante. In defending the absolute veto
for the King, Mirabeau argued that the assembly could always overrule the veto by the threat of refusing to vote in favor of taxes." A number of delegates then responded that in
refusing to vote for taxes, the assembly would be cutting off
its nose to spite its face. "To cease payment of taxes, would
be like cutting one's throat in order to heal a wound in the

leg."' 74 The threat, in other words, would not be credible.

Third, rational framers can try to create the conditions
under which future legislatures will be able to exercise their
reasoning powers. At the Federal Convention, this Idea was
never mentioned. In the French assembly, it was central. In
some respects, as I said, the members of the Assembl~e Constituante thought more highly of their successors than did

their American counterparts. They believed that an assembly
existed to effectuate the transformation of preferences
through rational discussion, going well beyond a simple process of aggregation. 7 5 In the best-known statement of this

Id. at 571.
See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 2, at 539.
174 See id. at 547, 588.
175 When denying the presence of this argument in the American constitutional debates, I refer exclusively to what was said at the Federal Convention Itself. As Cass
Sunstein has pointed out, other Framers on later occasions expressed arguments
close to those put forth by Sieyes and Barnave cited in the text, specifically arguments against bound mandates on the grounds that they would impair the deliberative quality of the proceedings. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva/, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1559 (1988) (noting that a representative's task required
deliberation, which was inconsistent with a proposed amendment that would have
entitled constituents to "'instruct' their representatives about how to vote"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 895 (1986) (arguing that at times secrecy during decision making is necessary because if bargaining
positions are revealed to the public "views may harden, and the participants will be
less likely to arrive at a mutually acceptable accommodation"). Sunstein cites Madison to the effect that a large republic is more likely to produce "a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country," taking this
as a statement of the deliberative view of politics. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutions
and Democracies: An Epilogue, in CONSITrrrIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 327, 331-32
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). I believe, however, that Madison's concern
here Is with wisdom per se, not with deliberation. No doubt wise men will often de12
173
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view Sieyes argued that the "voeu national," the desire of the
nation, could not be determined by consulting the cahiers of
complaints and wishes that the delegates had brought with
them to Versailles."6 Bound mandates, similarly, could not
be viewed as expressions of the national will. Even in a democracy (a term that was used pejoratively at the time),
Sieyes said, people do not decide by forming their opinions at
home, bringing them to the voting booth and, if no majority
emerges, going back home to reconsider their views, once
this proagain isolated from one another. A fortiori, he said,
legislature.1
representative
a
in
absurd
be
cedure would
This procedure for forming a common will, Sieyes claimed, is
absurd because it lacks the element of deliberation and discussion: "[i]t is not a question of a democratic election, but of
proposing, listening, concerting, changing one's opinion, in
order to form in common a common will."'7 In the debates
over the revision of the constitution, d'Andr6 and Barnave
similarly claimed that the idea of constitutional convention
with bound mandates" 9 from primary assemblies would be a
betrayal of the representative system in favor of democracy.
In Barnave's view, "a personal wish or the wish of a faction,
which is not illuminated by a common deliberation, is not a
real wish (un voeu vdritable)."'8

This view had several other implications. Although he was
opposed to bicameralism, Sieyes believed that for purposes of
discussion the assembly might usefully be divided into two or
even three chambers. 8 ' After separate discussions and votes,
the outcome would be decided by adding up the votes in all
three chambers. In this way, according to Si~yes, one would
achieve the benefits of rational discussion while avoiding "error, haste or oratory seduction" stemming from a common
cause. 1" As observed by Condorcet, however, the argument
is specious. If the sections of the assembly were large, there
would still be room for eloquence and demagogy in each of
them, perhaps in favor of opposite opinions."
liberate. However, from a less elitist perspective, collective deliberation can also be
seen as a substitute for individual wisdom. note 2. at 595.
176 See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMIENTAIRES. supra

See id. Recall that the procedure described here was Rousseau's Ideal of politisupranote 117. and accompanying text.
cal decision-making. See ROUSSEAU.
178 8 ARCHIVES PARLEENTAIES. supranote 2. at 595.
179 See 30 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES. supra note 2. at 68, 115. These would be
177

bound mandates limiting the set of issues to be discussed, but not instructing the
delegates how to vote.
8
' D Id. at 115.
181 See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMNTAIRES, supranote 2. at 597.
182 Id.
183 CONDORCET, Examwn sur Cette Question: Est-a Utie de DIuLser une Assemblde
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A more compelling application was made by Mirabeau in a
discussion of the voting rules in the assembly.184 Replying to
a proposal that the quorum should be set at half of the total
number of the delegates, he said that this would amount to
giving a veto to the absent."' "However, this kind of veto is
the most fearsome and the most certain. While one can hope
to influence and convince individuals who are present, by the
use of reasons, what influence can one have on those who reply by not appearing?"" One cannot argue with the absent.
Turning finally to the motives of the framers themselves,
we may consider the possibility of an imperfectly rational
concern with the public good. Imperfect rationality- being
weak, and knowing it- can induce actors to take steps to
forestall predictable, undesirable behavior in the future. 7
The members of a constituent assembly can seek to structure
their own proceedings so as to minimize the scope of passion
and self-interest. Both eighteenth-century assemblies created institutional devices for this purpose.
At the Federal Convention, the sessions were closed and
secret. As Madison said later,
[had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they
would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to
maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no man felt
himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was
satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force
of argument."
Presumably, the fear was that the pride and vanity of the
delegates, as well as pressure from their constituencies,
might prevent them from backing down from an opinion once
they had expressed it. However, Sparks did not consider another effect of secrecy- that of pushing the debates away
from argument and towards bargaining. I return to this dilemma in Part VI.
Unlike the Federal Convention, the Assembl~e Constituante functioned also as an ordinary legislature. That arrangement, however, may be undesirable. A main task of a
constituent assembly is to strike the proper balance of power
between the legislative and the executive branches of government. To assign that task to an assembly that also serves
Nationale en PlusleursChambres?, in 9 OEUVRES DE CONDORcET 333, 345 (1847).
1
See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIREs, supra note
2. at 299.
185 See id.
186 Id
187For a discussion of the notion
of imperfect rationality, see chapter
of JON
ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND (forthcoming May 2000) (discussing the place ofIIprecommitment in consttutIon-making).
1883 FARRAND, supranote 1. at 479 (Madison
as reported by Jared Sparks).
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as a legislative body would be to ask it to act as judge in its
own cause. A constitution written by a legislative assembly
might be expected to give excessive powers to the legislature. I" In the abstract, this problem could be solved by
means similar to the ones used in legislative bodies, by
checks and balances. A royal veto over the constitution
might, for instance, have kept the legislative tendency to selfThe Assembl~e Constituante
aggrandizement in check.
its members ineligible to
voting
adopted another solution by
Robespierre, in his first
was
It
the first ordinary legislature.
I
for this "self-denying
assembly
the
won
great speech,
191 9 who
ordinance."

Although sometimes viewed by posterity as a disastrous
piece of populist overkill," 9 Robespierre's solution did correspond to a genuine problem. If framers have both the motive
and the opportunity to write a special place for themselves

into the constitution, they will do so.93 At the Federal Con-

vention, the motive may have been lacking. Although the
Framers were guided by the idea that future voters and politicians had to be assumed to be knaves (see9 above), they
More imviewed themselves as moved by loftier motives.
It was a
lacking.
was
portantly, perhaps, the opportunity
the Conthat
delegates,
the
of
control
given fact, outside the
had
constitution
the
once
forever
vention would be dissolved
contrast,
by
Constituante,
been written. In the Assembl~e
the founders had to take active steps to remove the opportugive themselves a privileged place in the constitunity to
95
tion. 1
An analogous problem arose in recent debates over the role of the senate in the
Polish Constitution. That body, which was created as part of the Round Table Talks
compromise, had little justification after the fall of communism. However, as the
senate will have a vote on the new constitution, It cannot be expected to abolish Itself. See Andrzej Rapaczynsld, ConstitutionalPolitics in Poland A Report on the ConstiutionalCommittee of the PolishParlianent,58 U. CHI. L REV. 595. 615 (1991).
190 See 26 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES. supra note 2. at 124.
189

191 J.M. THOMPSON, ROBESPIERRE 134-35 (1988).
192

FRANCOIS FURET, supra note 75. at 104.

As shown in WHrrE, supra note 147, at 131-75. the motive-opportunity distinction was central in the arguments of The Federalist To ensure checks and balances.
one ought to deny the branches of government either the motive or the opportunity
to extend their sphere. At the same time, they should have both the motive and the
opportunity to resist encroachments. With respect to the prevention of factious majorities, large electoral districts will prevent both the formation of factious motives
and the opportunity to act on such motives. For a discussion of similar arguments
in Tocqueville, see JON E SER. PSYCHOLOGIE POLITIQUE 135-86 (1990). For a more
general analysis, see JON ELSrER. NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 13-21
(1989).
SeeWHITE, supranote 147, at 114, 249 (citing ARTHUR 0. LOVFJOY. REFtECTIONS
1
193

ON HUMAN NATURE 51-52 (1961)).
195

In addition, Robespierre used the standard argument in the Assemble Consti-
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In Parts V and VI I move on to discuss, respectively, overt
and covert expressions of self-interest among the Framers.
This is the place, however, to make the point that apparently
self-interested behavior may in reality be guided by impartial
concerns. 196 In studies of the Federal Convention, it has been
found that the votes cast were correlated both with the economic interests of the Framers and with those of their con197
stituents.

As I am here assuming, for the sake of argu-

ment, that the framers were motivated exclusively by
impartial concerns, I shall ignore the first correlation. The
second correlation, however, is fully compatible with that assumption. To see this, we may note that the interests of constituencies may affect a delegate in two ways. On the one
hand, he may seek to represent these interests as well as
possible, whether out of duty or out of self-interest (he might
lose his political standing if he does less than his very best).
On the other hand, he may view the interests of his constituency as a constraint, rather than as an end to be promoted,
believing that unless those interests are minimally satisfied
the constitution will not be ratified. There is no point in proposing a constitution that is a perfect embodiment of impartial ideals if one can predict with confidence that it will fail to
be adopted. For that reason, even the most impartially motivated framer may have to take account of partial interests.
This argument might generate two opposite reactions.
One might respond that it is inappropriate for framers to internalize political obstacles in this way. Rather, they should
write what they perceive as the best constitution and then try
to persuade their constituents to adopt it. The strategy of the
federalists at the Federal Convention and afterwards is often
cited as an example. Or one might argue that the political
constraints tend to be so strong as to remove any scope for
impartiality. Both responses are implausible. Some constraints are so strong that no amount of persuasion will remove them. At the Federal Convention, there may have been
a majority for abolishing the slave trade, yet the need for ratituante that the assembly not only had to be pure, but had to be seen as pure.
See
26 ARCHIVES PARLEMETAIRES, supranote 2, at 124.
196 See infra Part IV for a lengthy
discussion of the converse point.
197 See generally CHARLES A.
BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1986) (stating that the Framers were moved by
their personal self-interests); Robert A. McGuire, Constitution Making: A Rational
Choice Model of the FederalConvention of 1787, 32 AM. J. POL. SC. 483 (1988) (finding that the economic interests of the constituencies of the various delegates have
more power to explain voting patterns at the Convention than the economic interests
of the Framers themselves, although the latter are not negligible. He fails to distinguish, though, between interests as maximands and interests as constraints.).
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fication made any proposal to that effect impossible. As
Charles Cotesworth Pinkney said, even "if himself & all his
colleagues were to sign the Constitution & use their personal
influence, it would be of no avail towards obtaining the assent
1
of their Constituents" to the prohibition of the slave trade. "
Conversely, framers can play on transaction costs as well as
uncertainty to carve out a space for impartiality. If time is of
the essence, constituents may accept a minimally satisfactory
proposal rather than send the delegates back to a new convention. Also, there may be considerable uncertainty as to
what arrangement would be optimal from the point of view of
the constituents.
I conclude this Part with a brief discussion of rights-based
arguments. I shall first introduce an issue that will be more
thoroughly canvassed in Parts V and VI, viz. the debate at the
Federal Convention over the representation of the states in
We shall observe that both small and large
the Senate."
states resorted to arguing as well as bargaining to get their
way.
In Part V I show how representatives of the large states invoked the difference between 1776 and 1787 as a bargaining
argument in their favor. That contrast was also stated in
terms of justice and rights rather than of bargaining power.
According to Sherman, the time had now come to undo the
As James
inequality created at the birth of the republic.2
Wilson noted,
[t]hat the great states acceded to the confederation, and that
they in the hour of danger, made a sacrifice of their interest to
the lesser states is true. Like the wisdom of Solomon in adjudging the child to its true mother, from tenderness to it the greater
states well knew that the loss of a limb was fatal to the confederation- they too, through tenderness sacrificed their dearest
the time is come. when Justice
rights to preserve the whole. But
201
will be done to their claims ....
Patterson turned the argument on its head.
It was observed... that the larger State gave up the point, not
because it was right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason at
liberty to take it back. Can
2 2 the donor resume his gift Without
the consent of the donee. 0
19 2

FARRAND. supranote 1, at 371.

See also Jon Elster, Equal or Proportional? Arguing and Bargaining over the
Senate at the Federal Convention, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL INSITrMONS 145-60 (Jack
Knight & Itai Sened eds., 1995).
See 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 348.
201 id
'o Id. at 250-51.
199
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For some, justice requires contracts to be binding even if they
are unfair. For others, justice requires contracts to be undone if they are unfair.2
A second impartial argument also turns on opposing conceptions of justice, as well as on the opposition between justice and efficiency. John Dickinson argued that any scheme
that would give some states no representation in the Senate
would be "unfair. ° Madison argued that any deviation from
proportional representation was "unjust".0
To reconcile
these two claims from justice, the smallest state could be
given one representative, and the larger ones a proportionally
larger number. That solution would, however, create a very
large Senate, which would, in Madison's eyes, be "inexpedient".
One way of characterizing the system that was finally
chosen would be to say that expediency or efficiency, together
with Dickinson's conception of justice, won out against Madison's conception.
The debates over suffrage in the two assemblies were
similarly concerned both with rights and efficiency. On the
one hand, there was a concern for outcomes, i.e. with good
decision-making. In both assemblies, property restrictions on
suffrage were justified by various consequentialist arguments.
In his speech on the suffrage, Barmave argued for property
qualifications on the grounds that they tend to promote "enlightenment, interest in public affairs, and financial independence. " "' At the Federal Convention, Gouverneur Morris
similarly argued that property rather than tax-paying should
be the criterion for the right to vote.2° If the poor had the
vote, the rich would bu their votes, and an aristocracy of
wealth would be set up.
On the other hand, as we have seen, there was a concern
with the (conditional) right to participate. Various voting
203Although one may argue that contracts made under duress
are not binding if
force is exercised by one party over the other, see Jules Coleman & Charles Silver,
Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102 (1986), It is much less clear that the
same argument applies if the duress Is due to external circumstances that affect
both parties equally, thus undoing any natural inequalities that may exist. On this
point, therefore, I believe Patterson had the better argument. I am quite prepared to
believe, though, that it was made largely on opportunistic grounds. See Infra Part
VI.
204 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 159.
205 Id. at 151.
206 Id.

20729 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES,
208 See 2 FARRAND, supra note

supranote 2, at 366.

1, at 202.

209 Although property and tax-paying are correlated, and each can be used as a
proxy for the other, the arguments for basing the right to vote on the one or the other
are quite different. One is supposed to have good consequences, the other to reflect
prior rights.

Mar. 2000]

M.VO CONSTfTUENT ASSEMBLIES

schemes can be seen as attempting to incorporate all of these
elements, instrumental as well as rights-based. Thus on
August 28, 1791, the Constituent Assembly set up a threetiered system that was designed to ensure universal participation as well as quality of decision-making. At the lowest
level, there were weak tax-paying qualifications for being an
active citizen, including the right to vote in the primary assemblies. These assemblies elected a corps of electors who in
turn chose the deputies to the national assembly. Eligibility
as an elector required relatively strong income qualifications.
Eligibility as a deputy, however, only required satisfaction of
the weak qualification. Here, the (conditional) right to participate is embodied in the first and third stages, and the instrumentalist requirements of competence at the second
stage. In Philadelphia, a similar system was advocated by
Madison, who "concurred with Mr. Govr. Morris in thinking
that qualifications in the Electors would be much more effectual than in the elected. The former would discriminate
between real & ostensible property in the latter ....

2

,o In

elected who want to pass
this way, one would not see21people
1
laws against their creditors.

More generally, when rights and efficiency point in the
same direction, they are more powerful than an argument 1of2
either kind opposed by an argument of the other kind.
Framers can go to great lengths to make it appear that a
measure whose real justification is obviously utilitarian can
also be defended in terms of rights. They may even substitute a rights-based argument for a utilitarian one, if the latter
for some reason is thought to be unacceptable.3 3 An instance
of such substitution was found in the debates in the Assemblae Constituante over the confiscation of Church property.
In the earlier stage of the French assembly, the delegates
were more reluctant to argue in terms of the "salut public"
than they came to be later. Thus in their attempts to justify
the confiscation of the Church goods, both the opportunistic
Mirabeau and the hypocritical Talleyrand argued that these
goods belonged to the nation, not that financial crisis made
confiscation necessary. The argument, unbelievably bad as it
was, went as follows. If the Church had not, on the basis of
its income and property, provided religious services and as210
211
212
213

2 FARRAND, supra note 1. at 124.
See also WOOD, supra note 15. at 214.
For an elaboration of this theme, see JON ELsTER. LOCALJUSTICE (1992).
Such substitutions have obvious similarities with the 'strategic uses of argu-

ment" discussed in Part VI. However, my focus in that later discussion is the substitution of impartial arguments for self-interested ones. Here. I consider the substitution of one impartial argument for another.
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sistance to the poor, the State would have had to do so.
Therefore, the State is the real owner of that property." 4 The
best reply to this specious argument came from ClermontTonnerre, based on a deep and modem understanding of the
rights of corporate actors.1 But we can also follow Camus
and proceed by analogy. A father has the obligation to provide a dowiy for his daughter. Assume that a friend or a
relative is willing to provide it instead, thereby discharging
the father of his obligation. Should we imply that he thereby
becomes the owner of the dowry offered to his daughter?2 "'
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL BARGAINING

I now consider another aspect of "how to do things with
words." Rational discussion is supposed to be based only on
"the power of the better argument." Constitutional bargaining, by contrast, rests on resources that can be used to make
threats (and promises) credible. I shall focus on extrapolitical resources, such as money, manpower, and foreign
allies. These sources of bargaining power exist independently
of the political system. In addition, however, constitutional
bargaining may be based on resources created in the assembly itself. Logrolling, further considered below, is an important example in the constitutional context. The strategic use
of bound mandates from one's constituents is another (although, as we shall see, more fragile) strategy of this kind. In
legislative settings, the government can threaten to resign or
to dissolve parliament unless its proposal is adopted. If the
rules of the institutions allow it, legislators can threaten to
filibuster unless the government withdraws a bill.
These contrasts can be summarized as follows. On the
one hand, we may distinguish between intra-political and extra-political bargaining, depending on whether the resources
used in bargaining are created by the political system itself or
not. On the other hand, we can distinguish between horizontal bargaining among legislators and vertical bargaining
among government and legislators.
Of the four ensuing
cases, the only one not considered below is that of vertical,
intra-political bargaining. In the two constituent assemblies,
such government-legislator bargaining as took place (notably
between Louis XVI and the Assemblde Constituante) was
based on extra-political resources.
214 For Mirabeau's most explicit statements,
see 9 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES. supra
note 2, at 639-45.
215 See id. at 496.
216 See id. at 416.
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The notion of credibility is at the core of the analysis of
bargaining.217 Usually, carrying out a threat is costly. Moreover, to do so is usually pointless, because the very fact that
one has to carry it out means that the threat has failed to
work and that the harm it was supposed to prevent is already
done. A rational actor would never carry out an act that involves some costs and no benefits. Other rational actors,
being aware of this fact, will take no account of a threat if
nevertheless made. 8 In this respect, there is an important
distinction between threats and promises.1 9 By the very fact
of uttering a promise to do something that it will not be in his
interest to do, a speaker makes a binding normative commitment to the promisee. In the case of threats, no such
bond is created. The addressee will certainly not hold the
threatener to his threat, as a promisee will hold the promiser
to his promise. In certain cultures, however, third parties will
punish those who make empty threats. Such costs can make
it rational to carry out the threat if necessary and, in consequence, rational both to make it and to yield to it.
Consider first bargaining based on resources that arise
within the assembly itself, specifically vote-trading or logrolling.' To illustrate, assume that there are two proposals, X
and Y, on different issues. There are three parties, A, B and
C. A and B form a majority against X, B and C a majority
against Y. However, both A and C prefer the package (X Y) to
no legislation at all. With separate voting on the two proposals, both will fail. If A and C trade votes, both will pass.
Logrolling in the constituent assembly usually differs from
that in a legislative assembly in two respects. First, there is
The pioneering studies were made in THOMAS C. SCHEL NG. THE STRATEGY OF
More recently, non-cooperative game theory has allowed the construction of a rich formal theory of credibility. For a superb non-technical exposition, see DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING (1990). Recent
surveys in the spirit of Schelling are Avinash DL'it & Barry Nalebuff. Making Strate217

CoNFuCr (1960).

gies Credible, in STRATEGY AND CHOICE 161 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed.. 1991). and
JON ELSTER, THE CEMNr OF SOCIETY 272-87 (1989).
218 I simplify. If A makes a non-credible threat to B. the latter may respond in one

of several ways. He may conclude that A is stupid (or believes B to be stupid). e.g..
that he falls to understand that B will understand that the threat will not be carried
out. Or he may conclude that A is Irrational. In that case. however. B should contemplate the possibility that the threat might actually be carried out. Or he may
contemplate the possibility that A. being neither stupid nor irrational, wurants to sow
the seed of suspicion in B's mind that he is irrational. For further discussion along
these lines, see David Kreps & Robert Wilson. Reputaon and ImpeIfect Information.
27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982).
219 In the theory of speech acts. promises have been studied quite intensively. See
SEARLE. supra note 6. at 58-75. Threats (and warnings) have been discussed much

more cursorily, with little attention to conceptual nuances.
=0 For a useful introduction, see MUELLER. supra note 12. at 82-94.

[Vol. 2:2

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

no indefinitely continuing interaction that can force the parties to stick to their promises through fear of losing their
reputation.22' Second, voting on the separate issues that are
being traded off against each other is not really separate and
successive, because the assembly concludes its task by
adopting the constitution as a whole. In theory, the two differences should offset each other, but in practice they may
not. As the assembly and its committees work their way
through the issues, compromises may be reached that are
hard to undo, even should one of the parties renege on their
promises.2 Such practices are probably best seen as a form
of extra-constitutional bargaining. One party may act on the
assumption that the other will be unwilling to be seen as responsible for breaking off negotiations, or that the other has
more to lose by having to start all over again.2
At the Federal Convention, the best-known piece of logrolling took place between the slaveholding states and the
commercial states. As in the cases of logrolling in the Assembl~e Constituante that I discuss below, this one took
place against the background of extra-political bargaining.
The two strands are in fact hard to separate from each other.
At the surface the proposal that was adopted involved an exchange in which the South made a concession on the Navigation Acts while the North compromised on the slave trade."
However, the initial report from the Committee of Detail 225 had
essentially given the Southerners all they wanted,226 pre221

For this aspect of logrolling, see Douglass C. North, Institutions and a

Transaction-CostTheory of Exchange, in PERSPECTVES ON

POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY

182, 190-91 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
= See MARrIN DIAMOND ET AL., THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 58-59 (2d ed. 1970),
which summarizes the process as follows:
complex political struggles often come down to a single issue in which all the
passions, all the forces find their focus. When that single issue is settled It is
as if all the passions and forces are spent. Both sides seem somehow obliged
fully to accept the outcome and matters move quickly thereafter. This emotional dynamic will be an obstacle to going back to an issue if some more or
less clearly stated promise fails to be kept.
Id.

= In the West German assembly of 1948, "the Minister President of Bavaria ...
persuaded the SPD to vote for [the institution of] a Bundesratin exchange for a momentary advantage and concessions which were subsequently all but abandoned."
PETER H. MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC 69

(1963).

During the

debates over the Spanish constitution in 1978, the Union of the Democratic Center
was accused "of breaking a painstakingly negotiated set of compromises," leading to
the withdrawal of the Socialist member on the subcommittee." BONIME-BLANC, supra
note 5, at 56.
See2FARRAND, supranote 1, at 396.
See id. at 176.
=6 See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional
Convention: Making a
Covenant with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTrrY 188, 211 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
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sunably based on the perception of a credible threat that
otherwise the Southern states would leave the Union. Compared to this baseline, the later compromise may be seen as a
retraction by the South as the North called their bluff.
In the Assembl~e Constituante, the most famous piece of
logrolling took place in the last days of August 1789, when
the assembly was about to debate the basic institutions of the
state.2 7 In three meetings between Mounier on the one hand
and the "triumvirate," Barnave, Duport and Alexandre
Lameth, on the other, the three came up with the following
proposal. They would offer Mounier both an absolute veto for
the King and bicameralism, if he in return would accept (i)
that the King gave up his right to dissolve the assembly- (ii)
that the upper chamber would have a suspensive veto only;
and (iii) that there would be periodical conventions for the revision of the constitution.m Mounier refused outright. According to his own account, he did not think it right to make
concessions on a matter of principle; also he may have been
in doubt about the ability of the three to deliver on their
promise. According to Mathiez, he refused because he was so
confident that the assembly was on his side that no concessions were needed.22
Prior to the adoption of the suspensive veto another piece
of horsetrading, involving Barnave and the King's ministers,
had taken place.2 ° The question was whether the royal veto
should apply to the decisions of the Assembl6e Constituante
itself or only to later legislatures. On the former hypothesis,
it was feared that the King would refuse to give his sanction
to the abolition of feudal dues decided on August 4th. At this
point, Barnave apparently took it for granted that the King
could at most obtain a suspensive veto; hence he proposed
and obtained a deal that would ensure this veto in return for
a promise that it would not be applied to the constituent assembly. However, once the suspensive veto had been accepted, the ministers reneged on their promise. The King
called in a regiment from Flanders for a show of force, thus
starting the countdown to the events on October 5 and 6 that
would force him to move to Paris.
In the dealings I have just described, the presence of extra-political elements is evident. The members of the constituent assembly were suspended, as I said, between the

227

See 1 ORATEURS, supra note 2. at 933.

= See &L
22 See Mathiez. supra note 81, at 268.
= The following draws on Mathlez, supra note 81. at 268.
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King's troops and the Parisian crowd."m ' At the Federal Convention we find several references to such extra-political elements, notably in the debates over the representation of the
small states in the Senate. The small states wielded the
threat of an alliance with foreign powers, and the large states
countered with reference to their own might.
On June 30, 1789, Bedford asserted that
[tihe Large States dare not dissolve the confederation. If they do
the small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good
faith, who will take them by the hand and do them Justice. He
did not mean by this to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural
consequence; which ought to be avoided byMEnlarging
the federal
2
powers not annihilating the federal system.

On July 5, Gouvemeur Morris counterattacked:
Let us suppose that the larger States shall agree; and that the
smaller refuse: and let us trace the consequences. The opponents of the system in the smaller States will no doubt make a
party, and a noise for a time, but the ties of interest, of kindred
& of common habits which connect them with the other States
will be too strong to be easily broken. In N. Jersey particularly
he was sure a great many would follow the sentiments of Pena. &
N. York. This Country must be united. If persuasion does not
unite it, the sword will. He begged that this consideration might
have its due weight. The scenes of horror attending civil commotion can not be described, and the conclusion of them will be
worse than the term of their continuance. The stronger party
will then make traytors of the weaker; and the Gallows & Halter
will finish the work of the sword. How far foreign powers would
be ready to take part in the confusions he would not say.
Threats
that they will be invited have it seems been thrown
33
out.2

We should note for future reference that both statements
are somewhat ambiguous.'
They can be read as threats
(telling the addressee what the speaker and those he represents will do unless he complies) or as warnings (telling the
addressee what will happen unless he complies).
In the
French context, there was no ambiguity at all with respect to

what the King was doing. When, in the first days of July, he
reinforced the presence of troops near Versailles, the implied

threat to the assembly escaped nobody. Mirabeau's replies to
the King's challenge were, however, subject to the threatIn the Spanish transition to democracy In 1978, the army and the military
branch of the Basque movement were a permanent presence during the constitutional debates. The Round Table talks in Hungary and Poland were similarly suspended between fear of Soviet ntervention and the risk of mass demonstrations.
232 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 492.
= 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 530.
234 See infra part IV.
2
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warning ambiguity. In his first speech on the subject he
spoke in quite general terms: "How could the people not become upset when their only remaining hope [i.e., the assembly] is in danger?"2 In his second speech he became more
specific. The troops "may forget that they are soldiers by
contract, and remember that by nature they are men.
Furthermore, the assembly cannot even trust itself to act responsibly: "Passionate movements are contagious: we are
only men, nous ne sommes que des hommes, our fear of appearing to be weak may carry us too far in the opposite direction."2
In his brief intervention in the same debate, Sieyes mentioned that in all deliberative assemblies, notably in the Estates of Brittany, the assembly refused to deliberate if troops
were located closer than twenty-five miles from where it was
sitting.2 However, when the assembly asked for the removal
of the troops, the King in his response pretended that they
had been brought to control Paris rather than to terrorize the
assembly. If the assembly objected to the presence of troops
in the vicinity of Paris, he would have been perfectly happy to
move the assembly to Noyon or Soisson, and to move himself
to Compiigne in order to facilitate communication between
them.' However, the assembly could not accept a proposal
that would deprive them of the threat potential of Paris. It
was therefore decided to send a delegation to the King, asking
him to recall the troops "whose presence adds to the desperation of the people (dont iaprdsence irite le desespotr du
If the King agreed, the assembly would send a
peuple)."
delegation to Paris "to tell the good news and contribute to a
return of order."" There was no need to say what they would
do if he failed to accommodate them. The next day the Bastille fell, and the King agreed to send the troops away.
As the balance of power shifted, the moderates came to
believe that the main threats to the assembly were the radical
sections of the Paris Commune rather than the troops of the
King. On August 31, Clermont-Tonnerre proposed that the
assembly leave Versailles for some other place in case the

2

8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES. supra note 2. at 209.
Id. at 213.

id.

See &d at 210. These passages. too, are further dissected in Part Vl. The constitution adopted on September 3, 1791 contained a clause that forbade troops to
come closer than 37 miles to the assembly. LA CONSTrItrlON [CONST.I art. 3. § 3. cl.

1.5 (Fr.).
See d. at 219.
Id. at 229.
241 Id.
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authorities in Paris were unable to keep the peace. 'You did
not give in to arned despotism; will you now yield to popular
effervescence? " 24 2 A few days later the other moderates and
the nobility joined him, the former believing that the move
would save the assembly, the latter hoping that it would destroy it.m Inexplicably, the King refused. Instead, as I said,
he called in the regiment from Flanders, a decision that in the
end brought both King and assembly to Paris.
I shall now return to the Federal Convention, and take a
second look at the bargaining that took place over the representation of the small states in the Senate. Earlier, I referred
to the disguised threats of civil war and the intervention of
foreign powers.2" In addition, delegates from the large states
threatened that, unless they got their way, they would form a
separate confederation that would exclude the small states. I
shall now consider the credibility of this threat. 45
To address this issue it is necessary to first say something
about bargaining theory in general. Bargaining concerns the
division of the benefits from cooperation, compared to a permanent breakdown of cooperation. In the case of bargaining
among separate states, this alternative is merely the ordinary
international order (or anarchy). In the case of bargaining
among estates, among political parties, between civil and
military institutions or between civil and religious institutions, the non-cooperative alternative is harder to specify.
For reasons that will become clear later, this difficulty does
not necessarily matter for bargaining theory, as its most important requirement is that we are able to specify what will
happen during a temporary breakdown of cooperation. On
that basis, the theory attempts to predict whether an efficient
2A2 Id.

at 513.

Mathiez, supra note 81, at 272.
24 See supra note 233 and accompanying
text.
245 A similar problem arose in constitutional debates
in Czechoslovakia, before the
dissolution of the federation, when Slovokia was able to obtain parity of power in
many parts of the federal system as well as considerable autonomy for the republic.
One cause, among several, may be that the Slovaks backed their demands with a
threat of secession. Some political leaders in Slovakia had in fact genuinely been
working for secession. See Jiri Pehe, Growing Slovak Demands Seen as Threat to
Federation,REP. ON E. EURL,Mar. 22, 1991, at 1. Other and more responsible politicians, who did not share this goal, nevertheless and with some success used the
threat of secession as a bargaining chip. See Jiri Pehe, Power-SharingLaw Approved
by FederalAssembly, REP. ON E. EUIl, Dec. 21, 1990, at 6. In light of what I said
earlier, it is possible that the former were the unwitting tools of the latter. The Slovak leaders who negotiated with the Czech and federal governments may have been
issuing warnings rather than threats: unless you give in to our demands the nationalist drive for secession will become irresistible. This hypothesis seems to make
better sense than the threat hypothesis, as it is hard to see how a threat of secession
would be credible.
243
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agreement, that is, an outcome on the Pareto-frontier, will be
realized and, if so, which of the many Pareto-optimal outcomes will be realized.2
Bargaining theory has two distinct branches. The most
developed is two-person bargaining theory, as applied, for instance, to wage bargaining between capital and labor. In the
following, I shall limit myself to this theory, and ignore the
more adequate but less tractable n-person theory. We can,
however, use two-person theory to throw some light on the nperson case. In analyzing the Federal Convention, we may to
some extent talk as if the large states formed one actor and
the small states another, and use two-person theory to understand the nature of the bargaining between them. There
were, however, other cross-cutting divisions among the states
that rivaled with the size issue as potential foci for coalition
formation. 247 Hence, a more adequate account would have to
specify the payoff structure for all possible subcoalitions of
the states, and propose a theory that, on the basis of these
payoffs, predicts that the grand coalition will form and the
terms on which it will form. The first task is impossible for
practical reasons, and the second is at present unresolved.
Let us assume that the parties to the bargaining are rational and, more specifically, that they act to maxdiize some
set of tangible rewards. In that case, the outcome of bargaining is largely shaped by two factors. On the one hand,
the outcome is constrained by the outside options of the parties, i.e. by the rewards they would obtain if the bargaining
broke down and a permanent state of non-cooperation was
obtained. A rational agent will not accept an outcome that is
worse than his outside option. In classical (pre-1980) bargaining theory, these outside options were seen as the exclusive determinants of the outcome.m In addition to serving as
a floor on the outcome, these options, according to the classical theory, also determine where on the Pareto frontier the
outcome will be found. Modem, post-1980 bargaining theory
asserts that the outcome, although constrained by the out246 To my knowledge, the only attempt to apply bargaining theory to the constitu-

tional process is that of Douglas D. Heckathom & Steven M. Maser. Bargaining and
ConstituinalContracts,31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 142 (1987). The article is valuable in its
insistence that constitution-maklng must be seen as a bargaining issue rather than
as a collective action problem with a single Pareto-optimal outcome. It relies, however, mainly on classical bargaining theory and hence does not confront the problem
of the credibility of threats or the problem of "action at a distance.'
27 See generallyJILLSON, supra note 15.
For a non-technical exposition, see JON ELSTER. THE CF2.1EET OF SOCIETY 54-68
For a full exposition, see ALVIN E. ROTH.
(1989) [hereinafter ELSTER, CEMENT].
AXIOMATIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1979).
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side options, will be determined by the inside options of the
parties, i.e. by the resources available to them while the negotiations are going on.2 9 Both outside and inside options
matter for the credibility of threats. An agent can credibly
threaten to break off cooperation (forever) if he can get more
on his own than the other offers him. And he can credibly
threaten to suspend cooperation (temporarily) if he can afford
to hold out for a better offer.
Rather than elaborate on the formal definitions, let me explain the idea of outside and inside options by an illustration
from wage bargaining. For the workers, the outside option is
set by the wage they could obtain elsewhere or the level of
unemployment benefits. Their inside option is set by the size
of their strike fund and what other support they might receive
during a strike. The outside option of the firm is set by the
resale value of the plant, while its inside option is determined
by fixed costs, inventory size and the like. Outside options
constrain the wage agreement: neither the workers nor the
firm will accept an outcome that is inferior to what they could
get on their own. Inside options determine the credibility of
strike or lockout threats if they do not get a certain amount
over and above their outside options.'
The last proposition throws light on James Wilson's argument that the equality of states in the Confederation was due
to "the urgent circumstances of the time"" or to "necessity",2 52 and that the Convention ought to adopt proportional
representation since "[tihe situation of things is now a little
altered."'
In a time of national danger, time is of the essence. No single state can better afford to hold out than any
other; hence bargaining power is equalized.'
In periods of
comparative calm, the larger and more self-sufficient states
regain their natural bargaining advantage.
Madison suggested a different argument for the same con249 For a non-technical exposition, see ELSTER, CEMENT,
supra note 248, at 68-82.
For a semi-technical exposition, see John Sutton, Non-Cooperative BargainingTheor An Introductlon, 53 REV. ECON. STUD. 709 (1986).
The exact way in which inside options determine the outcome Is
analyzed by a
formal technique known as "backward induction." Crucial parameters include the
order in which offers and counteroffers are made, the delay between the offers, the
rate of time discounting of the parties, their degree of risk aversion, any fixed costs
incurred during the bargaining period, and the probability that the potential benefits
from cooperation might be destroyed by exogenous events.
251 1 FARRAND, supranote 1. at 179.
252

I& at 343.

ICL
The following analogy may be useful. The bargaining power of trade unions
Is
often restricted by their limited strike funds. If,
however, the state imposes compulsory arbitration after two weeks of strike, their bargaining power Is enhanced.
253
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clusion. He addressed the smaller states who wanted equal
representation:
He begged them to consider the situation in which they would
remain in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissable
plan, should prevent the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such an event was painful; but it would be prudent to
submit to the task of examining it at a distance, that the means
of escaping it might be the more readily embraced. Let the union
of the States be dissolved and one of two consequences must
happen. Either the States must remain individually independent
& sovereign; or two or more Confederacies must be formed
among them. In the first event would the small States be more
secure agst. the ambition & power of their larger neighbours,
than they would be under a general Government pervading with
equal energy every part of the Empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part agst. every other part? In the second, can the smaller expect that their larger neighbours would
confederate with them on the principle of the present confederacy, which gives to each member, an equal suffrage; or that they
would exact less severe concessions from the smaller States,
than are proposed in the scheme [of proportional representa-

tion]-?
Here, Madison is characterizing various outside options of

the small states, without explicitly mentioning those of the
larger states. Nathaniel Gorham supplemented the argument
in this respect:
The States as now confederated have no doubt a right to refuse
to be consolidated, or to be formed into any new system. But he
wished the small States which seemed most ready to object, to
consider which are to give up most, they or the larger ones. He
conceived that a rupture of the Union wd. be an event unhappy
for all, but surely the large States would be least unable to take
care of themselves, and to make connections with one another.
interested n establishing some
The weak therefore were mostorder.25
maintaining
for
system
general
These statements, taken together, imply that the small

states are in a weaker bargaining position since they would
have more to lose if the union broke down. However, both the
small and the large states would be better off under either
scheme- equal and proportional representation- than they
would be on their own.25 The outside options do not, theresupranote 1, at 320-21.
' Id. at 462.
257 It is possible, however, that some of the states would be better off on their own
than as part of the Confederation. The opening debates of the Convention. in which
the issue was the strengthening of the national government may well have taken
place under the implicit and credible threat by some states to leave the Confederation.
1 FARRAND,
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fore, lend credibility to the threat of the large states to form a
separate confederacy, because, to repeat, they would be
worse off on their own than they would be in a union organized along the lines demanded by the small states. Madison
and Gorham were simply using the wrong model of bargaining. Wilson used the correct model, based on inside options,
in his reference to urgency and necessity. He claimed that
the large states had an edge in 1787 because they could afford to hold out longer than the small states.
To identify the fallacy behind the Madison-Gorham argument, consider Fig. 1:
D

Utility of II

B

J

Utility of I
Fig. 1
Here, the area enclosed by the two axes and the curve represents the set of feasible agreements, measured in utility
terms. The points d i and d 2 represent the outside options of
the parties under two different arrangements. Consider first
the bargaining situation in which d, is the outside option.
Classical bargaining theories pretend to be able to predict (or
prescribe) the solution on the basis of the feasible set and the
location of the outside option. One of these theories (chosen
here because it lends itself to easy diagrammatic exposition)
asserts that the solution will be the point on the Paretofrontier that will ensure for each party a gain (compared to
the outside option) that is proportional with his best possible
outcome, constrained only by the need to offer the other party
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In Fig. 1, the best possible
no less than his outside option.
outcome for I is at C, and the best possible outcome for II is
at A. The theory then asserts that the solution will be found
at the point x where the diagonal dB in the rectangle d1 ABC
intersects the Pareto-frontier. Assume now that the disagreement point shifts to d2 , so as to improve the outside option for I. The theory then asserts that the outcome in the
new game will be y, which is also more favorable for I. Better
outside options yield better outcomes. This is also the intuition underlying the Madison-Gorham argument: the more
you have to lose by failing to reach agreement, the less favorable for you the agreement that is reached. According to
modem bargaining theory, however, the intuition is correct
only to the extent that the outside options constrain the solution by providing a floor below which it cannot fall, which is
not the case in Fig. 1. As the first solution x still yields a better outcome for I than the new disagreement point d2, the
shift of disagreement point should not induce a shift in the
solution. To assert that it does is to assume an "action at a
distance" that cannot be supported by the theory of rational
behavior.
I asserted earlier that, in contrast to the Madison-Gorham
argument from outside options, Wilson's argument for the
same conclusion from inside options was formally valid. Yet,
as we know, the large states did not get their way. One possible explanation is that Wilson was wrong about his facts, so
that the situation was in fact perceived to be more urgent
than he made it out to be. As I said earlier, the degree of crisis in the Confederation in 1787 is an issue of some controversy. Although the solution adopted at the Convention cannot provide evidence on the objective degree of urgency, it
may perhaps indicate the urgency as perceived by the framers. Needless to say, I do not claim that the outcome- equal
representation of all states in the Senate- can be fully explained by bargaining theory. The enhanced log-rolling power
that the small states obtained by virtue of the voting rules at
the Convention might also be part of the explanation. The
normative, rights-based arguments discussed above may also
have had some impact. I am not, however, trying to explain
what happened at the Convention, a task for which I have no
competence. Rather, I am trying to identify a mechanism that
may or may not have been at work at the Convention, but
that certainly belongs to the repertoire of patterns one might
25 For the original statement of this theory. see Ehud Kalai & Meir Smorodinsky.
Other Solutions to Nashfs BargainingProblem. 43 ECONOMECA 513. 513-18 (1975].
For a non-technical discussion, see generally ELSTER. CF-mTr. supranote 248.
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expect to observe in constitutional settings.
In both constituent assemblies, as I have explained, delegates came with bound mandates. These belong to an important set of credibility-enhancing techniques usually referred to as strategies of precommitment. Burning one's ships
or bridges, cutting off lines of communication, constructing a
Doomsday machine and, for that matter, adopting a constitution are other examples of such strategic self-binding. To
see how bound mandates might serve this purpose, consider
first wage bargaining between a union and one branch of a
multiplant company. The trade union leader may ask his
members to instruct him to consult them before he accepts
any offer made by the management. The delay created by the
need for consultation will then give him an edge in bargaining. Although plant management may ask company headquarters to be bound in a similar manner, the slowness of
union balloting compared to company approval is, once
again, to the advantage of the union. The clumsier and more
inefficient the organization
of the union, the stronger its bar259
gaining power.
At the Federal Convention, the delegates from Delaware
came, as I said earlier, with instructions to insist on equal
representation of all states in the Senate. In fact, George
Read, one of the leading figures in his delegation, had specifically requested the Delaware legislature to give them this
mandate.' Also, some delegates argued that the Convention
as a whole had a limited mandate. Patterson claimed, for instance, that "[ijf the confederacy was radically wrong, let us
return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume
" ' The
them of ourselves."26
statement may or may not have
been a bargaining ploy, in the sense previously explained. If
it was, there is no indication that it succeeded. Although two
of the New York delegates left because they thought the Convention was exceeding its mandate, they never used the
threat to leave as a bargaining ploy.
At the Assemblae Constituante, a large number of the
delegates came with bound mandates.
Although many
wanted to go back to their constituencies to be released from
their promise to vote by order rather than by head, there is
no evidence that they were trying to exploit the strategic advantages of delay. If the assembly had agreed on the necessity of a formal release from the instructions, the potential for
See ERLING BARTH, INSTMTUE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, OSLO, STRATEGIC DELAYS AND
BARGAINING POWER IN WAGE BARGAINING 20 (1988).
260 See JILLSON, supra note
15, at 53.
261 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 250.
259
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such behavior would, however, have been present Given the
urgency of the situation, some of the moderates might then
have been willing to accept the vote by order rather than suffer the delay. However, even while the wish to go back to the
constituencies was being expressed, the assembly had already decided to go ahead under its own, self-made rules.
This difference between the trade union case and the Assemblie Constituante illustrates a more general point. Parties that bargain within a pre-existing institutional framework
can use it for strategic purposes.2 However, in times of crisis- which are often the setting in which constitutions are
written- the framework may not be inviolable. What has
variously been called "revolutionary redefinition of the rules
of the game," ' "self-created authority"2 and "revolutionary
self-authorization" 5 is, in fact, at the core of constitutionmaking, as distinct from mere amendments. As shown in
Part I above, the two assemblies did, to a large extent, define
their own rules in clear violation of the instructions or expectations of those who had called them into being. In general, therefore, precommitment is not a viable strategy in the
constitutional context. Although the constitution itself may
be seen as a form of precommitment, it cannot be shaped by
that technique.
VI.

STRATEGIC USES OF ARGUMENT'

In Parts IV and V I have been concerned with two polar
cases. First, I considered genuinely impartial reasoning,
moved by a concern for individual rights or the common good.
Next, I discussed overt self-interest at work in threat-based
bargaining. Although it is important to understand these
pure cases, an argument could perhaps be made that most
actual debates represent an intermediate category. I shall
not, however, attempt to make that argument. Instead, I
shall try to define that category as sharply as I can, and to
show that it was instantiated in the two assemblies.
Consider again the two Habermasian commitments to
truth and impartiality. Although speakers in constituent assemblies (and elsewhere) may not be genuinely committed to
these values, they may find it in their interest to appear to be
the protocol must be in existence prior to the negotiations. If the union leader says that he will consult his members without being obliged by his rules
to do so, the threat has no credibility.
M ACKERNMAN, supranote10. at 168.
24 PETERSUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMsr 254 (1990).
265 SMION SCHAMA. CrrzFNs 353 (1989).
2m2However,

28 For a fuller discussion, see ELSTER, ALCHFIES. supranote 147. at 332-403.
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so committed. They engage, that is, in strategic uses of purportedly non-strategic argument. On the one hand, bargainers often try to present their threats as warnings."' Instead
of uttering a threat, they substitute a factual equivalent of a
threat. On the other hand, self-interested actors often try to
ground their claims in principle. Their self-interest tells them
to appeal to an impartial equivalent of self-interest. In this
Part, I consider the constraints on these substitutions, the
reasons for making them, and the consequences of doing so.
I first consider the strategic use of impartial arguments.
Consider a group whose interest leads it to favor proposal A.
The question then arises whether the group can appeal to an
impartialequivalent of its self-interest, if for some reason (see
below) it does not want to strike a purely self-interested
stance. Is there, in other words, an impartial argument for
A? Suppose there is not. We can then ask what impartial
argument will favor a proposal as close as possible to A. In
the first case, we have a perfect fit between partial interest
and impartial arguments, and, in the second case, a maximal
fit. It is quite likely, however, that neither a perfect fit (if one
exists) nor a maximal fit will be optimal from the point of view
of the group. An impartial argument that coincides too well
with the interests of those who deploy it tends to arouse suspicion. If the well-off advocate tax breaks for all and only the
well-off, the impartial argument that such policies will benefit
all by a trickle-down effect is probably not optimal. If, however, an impartial argument is made that supports a diluted
conclusion, with tax breaks for most, but not all, who are
well-off and for some of the badly off as well, it is more likely
to be accepted. An argument that offers tax breaks only for
the badly off may also have a good chance of being accepted,
but would not be optimal from the point of view of the welloff. The well-off need an argument that deviates enough from
their self-interest to be accepted by others, while not deviating so much that nothing is gained if it is accepted.6
In the following, threats' should be read as 'threats and promises.' Similarly,
'varnings' must be understood as covering the factual equivalents of both threats
and promises. It is an interesting fact about the English language that it has no
word that stands to 'promise' in the same relation as Vwarning' does to 'threat'. See
267

ALBERr 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFING INVOLVEMENTS 13 (1982) (noting that neither English

nor any other language has a single word for the positive analogue of a disappointment; instead, a circumlocution such as 'a pleasant surprise' has to be used).
268 Similarly, Marxists have argued that it is in the
interest of the capitalist class to
have a state apparatus or an ideological system that does not in each and every respect promote the immediate interest of that class. See JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE
OF MARX 411, 472 (1985). These arguments fall because no plausible mechanism Is
suggested to bring about the optimal deviation from immediate class interest. At the
level of an individual, however, the deviation can be explained in terms of simple
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Some examples may be useful at this point In the 1920's,
FolYale College wanted to limit the admission of Jews.'
lowing a recent scandal at Harvard, they did not, however,
want to use explicit quotas. Instead, they adopted a policy of
geographical diversity, ostensibly as a goal in its own right,
but in reality as a measure taken to reduce the number of enrollments from the predominantly Jewish pool of applicants
from New York City. The beauty of this last strategy, from the
point of view of publicity-conscious admissions officers, was
that it could be presented as unbiased.
Though many individual Jews (concentrated in the northeast region from which Yale received most of its applications) would be
affected by this principle, it was not an innately anti-Jewish
principle. A geographical policy applied without regard to religion that would help an individual Milwaukee Jew or Duluth
Catholic as much as it would hurt a New York atheist or
Protestant could not appropriately be termed religiously
Hoboken
27
biased.

0

The impartial criterion of geographical diversity served as a
diluted and therefore more acceptable equivalent of religion.
Another example concerns restrictions on the right to vote.
In many societies, property has been used as a criterion for
suffrage. One may, to be sure, offer impartial arguments for
this principle. At the Federal Convention, Madison argued
that the stringent property qualifications for the Senate,
rather than protecting the privileged against thepeople, were
But, as I
a device for protecting the people against itself.'
said, there is something inherently suspicious about such arguments. They coincide too well with the self-interest of the
rich. It may then be useful to turn to literacy, as an impartial
criterion that is highly, but imperfectly, correlated with property. At various stages in American history, literacy has also
served as a legitimizing proxy for other partial goals,M such as
the desire to keep blacks or Catholics out of politics.
The strategic use of impartial arguments is a well-known
fact of political life.2 1 We know less, however, about the reacost-benefit calculations.

269 See DAN A. OREN, JOINING THE CLUB: A HISTORY OF JEWS AND YALE 198 (1985):
JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSICE 113-35 (1992) (discussing further this case and similar
ones).
OREN, supranote 269, at 198.
27 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 421-23.
m Ingrid Creppell, Democracy and Literacy: The Role of Culture In PoliticalLife. 30
ARCHIVES EUROPkENNES DE SocioLOGiE 22, 26-36 (1989).
2M in debates over electoral systems for instance, the following pattern is found
over and over again. Small parties argue for proportional representation on the
grounds that it is more respectful of democratic rights (and not because it improves
the chances of small parties). Large parties argue for sngle-member districts, on the
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sons why individuals find it in their self-interest to substitute
an impartial argument for their self-interest, and even less
about the consequences of such substitution strategies. Let
me begin with the most basic question: why argue at all?
Why not simply adopt a bargaining stance, or demand an
immediate vote without prior debate? I can think of four answers, but there may be others.
First, if others believe that one is truly arguing from principle, they may be more willing to back down. The belief that
a person is arguing from principle and is willing to suffer a
loss rather than accept a compromise will make other, selfinterested actors yield.274 In this respect, adopting a principle
is a form of precommitment. This strategy is especially likely
to be adopted by actors who otherwise have little bargaining
power. When the strong bargain from strength, the weak argue from principles.
Second, Jonathan Macey has argued that legislative coalitions tend to use public-regarding language as a "subterfuge"
for what is in reality a deal among special interests.275
The reason special interest legislation is so often drafted with a
public-regarding gloss is because this gloss raises the costs to
the public and to rival groups of discovering the true effect of the
legislation. This, in turn, minimizes the major cost to the legislator of supporting narrow interest group legislation- the loss of
2761
support from groups that are harmed by the legislation ....
Third, by citing a general reason one might actually be
able to persuade others. Assume (contrary to what I believe
to be the case) that speakers will listen to impartial argument
if and only if their self-interest is not at stake. 77 In an assembly, some speakers will favor a given proposal on the basis of their self-interest, others will oppose it, and some will
be neutral. It is in the self-interest of the parties involved to
grounds that this system enhances governmental efficiency (and not because It improves the chances of large parties). But see Rapaczynski, supra note 189 at 617
(claiming that the constitutional committee of the SeJm approached the matter of
electoral laws through philosophical discussion rather than in the spirit of Realpolltik). In fact, Rapaczynski concluded that some groups expressed a preference for
proportional representation "despite a potential party interest to the contrary." Id&
An even more striking example of "counter-interested" choice of electoral laws occurred when Vaclav Havel abstained from pursuing the electoral interest of Civic Forum because he thought a Communist presence in parliament was necessary for national reconciliation.
274 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairnessand
the Assumptions of Economtcs, 59 J.
Bus. S285 (1986); see generally JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 231-44 (1989);
ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WrrHIN REASON (1988).

275 See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest-GroupModeL 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 223, 250-56 (1986).
2
Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
277 See JILLSON, supranote 15, at 16.
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argue for their view in non-self-interested terms, to persuade
the neutrals to agree with them. This strategy is fully compatible with the third party knowing that the others are
moved purely by their interest. Moreover, the strategy is also
compatible with opportunistic and inconsistent use of impartial arguments. Consistency is required only for the purpose
of deceiving others, not for the purpose of persuading them.
Finally, in a very different line of reasoning, James Coleman argues that if "[members [of an assembly] appear hesitant to bring up self-interests and sometimes express disapproval when another member does so," it is because there is a
social norm "that says that no one should take a position that
cannot be justified in terms of benefits to the collectivity...."278 Moreover, that social norm is not accidental.
"Since such a norm is in the interest of all members of the
collectivity, it can be expected to emerge and to have some
strength.

This is not intended to be a purely functionalist

argument, although it sounds like one. Coleman argues that
collectively beneficial norms emerge through individually rational behavior. Each individual finds it in his interest to give
up some of his rights to control his own actions in exchange
for the right to control the actions of others.' In my opinion,
the argument fails to go through. I agree that there is a norm
of the type he describes, but I do not think it can be reduced
to individual self-interest. The individual framer might follow
the norm out of self-interest, however, if the sanctions imposed on violators are sufficiently strong.
An important common feature of these four reasons
should be noted. Although I am assuming that the actors
who make the impartial arguments are really moved by selfinterest, all four reasons for doing so are parasitic on genuinely impartial actors in the system. One cannot pretend
commitment to principle unless there is common knowledge
that some individuals are so motivated, and unless there is
uncertainty as to which individuals these are. There is no
reason to try to persuade others by impartial arguments if
one believes that everybody is moved by self-interest all the
time. Even if those who obey the norm against invoking selfinterest do so out of self-interest and fear of sanctions, those
who impose sanctions must ultimately do so for non-selfinterested reasons.28 Impartiality is logically prior to the attempt to exploit it (or the need to respect it) for self-interested
278

JAMES S. COLEMAN. FOUNDAIONS OFSOCIALTHEORY 383 (1990).

Id. at 384.
8 See Ud.at 241-300.
281 See JON ELSER. THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 132-33 (1989).
"r
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purposes. This is not to say, however, that impartial concerns are necessarily widespread. We know from other contexts that it may take only a tiny proportion of cooperators in
a population to induce everybody to behave as if they were
cooperators. 2 Similarly, a small group of impartially minded
individuals might induce large numbers to mimic their impartiality out of self-interest.2
The strength of these reasons will vary with the context.
The norm against self-interested claims can be expected to be
stronger in constituent assemblies than in ordinary legislatures. The system of checks and balances is intended to ensure that the interest of one group in the legislature will be
set up against the interests of other groups, so that the outcome may approximate the common interest. However, future generations have no spokesmen in the constituent assembly. Although the Federal Convention saw some blatant
attempts to bias the constitution in favor of the founding
states,2 intertemporally impartial arguments that allowed
future states equal influence won the day.2 Also, the norm
against expression of self-interest will be stronger in public
settings than if the debates are conducted behind closed
doors. A public setting will also encourage the use of precommitment through principle, with the larger audience
serving as a resonance board for the claim and making It
more difficult to back down.
From the reasons for adopting impartial disguises for selfinterest, I now turn to the consequences of this practice. Because these effects are heavily mediated by the setting of the
debates- closed versus open, or private versus public- I
shall first characterize the two assemblies in this respect.
At the Convention, the sessions were closed and the deliberations subject to a rule of secrecy respected by all.'
There
was little risk, therefore, of being prematurely locked into one
opinion, and correspondingly few opportunities and temptations to exploit such lock-in devices for strategic purposes.
The trick of transforming the Convention into the "committee
See generally David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982).
M This is mere speculation. Whereas Kreps and his co-authors offer a rigorous
proof (based, however, on somewhat artificial assumptions) for a large multiplier effect of cooperation, I have no idea whether a similar argument would go through in
thepresent case. However, no proof Is needed to assert a small multiplier effect.
See 2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 3.
See 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 578.
The small number of delegates must have been an important factor. Had there
been 1200 delegates at the Convention, as there were in the Assembl~e Constituante, it is virtually certain that the proceedings would have leaked out.
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of the whole" also made it possible to have preliminary votes
that did not commit the delegates to premature decisions.2
In the Assembl~e Constituante, the debates were not only
open to the public, but constantly interrupted by the public.
It was initially envisaged that the assembly would meet two
days a week, and work in subcommittees on the other days.2
However, the moderates and the patriots had very different
opinions on these two modes of proceeding. For Mounier,
leader of the moderates, the committees favored "cool reason
and experience," by detaching the members from everything
that could stimulate their vanity and fear of disapproval.'
For the patriot Bouche, committees tended to weaken the
He preferred the large assemblies,
revolutionary fervor.
where "souls become strong and electrified, and where
On his
names, ranks and distinctions count for nothing."'
sit
in plewould
proposal, it was decided that the assembly
num each morning and meet in committee in the afternoon.
Soon there were only plenary sessions. The importance of
this move, which constituted the beginning of the end for the
It was
moderates, was perfectly understood at the time.
that
a
procedure
reinforced by the move to voting by roll call,
enabled members or spectators to identify those who opposed
radical measures, and to circulate lists with their names in
Paris.
This difference between the two assemblies is reflected in
the debates. Many of the debates at the Federal Convention
were of high quality: remarkably free from cant and remarkably grounded in rational argument. By contrast, the
discussions in the Assemblde Constituante were heavily
tainted by rhetoric, demagoguery and overbidding. At the
same time, the Convention was also a place where many hard
bargains were driven, notably the deal between the slaveholding and the commercial states. The delegates from the
Southern States did not really try to argue that slavery was
morally acceptable, with the exception of a lame remark by
Charles Pinkney to the effect that "[ilf slavery be wrong, it is
287 The paralyzing scrutiny and attention given to the committee to discuss the
verification of credentials in the Assemblde Constituante form an instructive contrast. Moving from a plenary assembly to a small committee will not eliminate the
problems created by publicity unless there is a real willingness to keep things secret.
2S Great care was taken to form the subcommittees so as to prevent
the emergence of factions. They were essentially formed randomly (using an alphabetical order) and renewed each month so that the same deputies would never remain together.
See 1 ORATEURS, supra note 2, at 926.
2so 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENrAIRES, supra note 2, at 307.

291 EGRET, supra note 15. at 120. Later, Mounler strongly reproached himself
for
his inactivity on this occasion. See 1 ORATEURS, supranote 2, at 927.
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justified by the example of all the world."2 9 Instead, they
simply stated their position, using as leverage either the
threat to leave the Union or a warning that a constitution
unfavorable to the slave states might not be ratified. If the
proceedings had been held in public, they might have been
forced to pull their punches.
Turning now to a more systematic assessment of the strategic uses of impartial argument, in terms of the impact on
efficiency and equity, I shall first compare strategic impartiality and naked bargaining along the efficiency dimension.
We know that bargaining is vulnerable to the problem of misrepresentation of preferences: for a given bargaining mechanism, the parties may have an incentive to report false preferences that yield Pareto-inferior outcomes in terms of their
real preferences.
In addition, bargaining may be inefficient
because of the difficulty of making credible promises that, if
believed and respected, would benefit all parties.' 4 Mutual
precommitment
to incompatible positions is a third source of
inefficiency." 5
The strategic use of impartiality is also vulnerable to the
problem of mutual precommitment. When both sides appeal
to principle, neither may feel able to back down. There is no
analogue to the first source of inefficiency in bargaining; and
the second problem is also less likely to arise because the
very same motives that make speakers adopt the arguing,
rather than the bargaining, attitude will also induce them to
keep their promises. However, public debates introduce an
additional source of inefficiency, through the autonomous
dynamics of political life. The need to demarcate oneself
ideologically from the opponent, even when there is no real
disagreement, can lead to false polarization and thus create
an impasse. The attempt by the opponent to avoid this trap
can lead to false consensus, yielding a decision that is inferior
in the eyes of both sides.29 The Assembl~e Constituante of
1789-91 showed many striking instances of radical and
egalitarian overbidding by which the parties became locked
292
293

2 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 371.
See Joel Sobel, Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem, 49

ECONOMETRICA 597 (1981) (arguing that inefficiency arises only in the case of bargaining over multi-dimensional goods).
29 See JON ELsTER, THE CEMENT OF SOcIETY 272-73 (1989).
295 See Vincent P. Crawford, A Theory of Disagreement In Bargaining, 50
ECONOMEIuCA 607 (1982).
296 Here I draw on Tocquevflle's analysis of assembly life under the July
Monarchy:
"one constantly finds one party exaggerating sentiments it does feel in order to embarrass its opponents, while the latter feigns sentiments It does not feel In order to
avoid the trap." TOCQUEVILLE, RECOLLECIONS, supranote 43, at 99.
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into attitudes that had originally been adopted merely for
tactical purposes.
It follows, I think, that neither bargaining nor strategic use
of impartial reasoning is unambiguously more efficient than
the other. By contrast, I believe we can assert that argument- even when purely strategic and based on selfinterest- tends to yield more equitable outcomes than bargaining. For the reasons mentioned above, argument- especially in a public setting- will prevent the strong from using
their bargaining power to the hilt. The optimal impartial
equivalent will be one that dilutes their self-interest by taking
some account of the interest of the weak. On the average,
this will yield more equitable outcomes.' This is the effect I
referred to earlier as the civilizingforce of hypocrisy.
The preceding remarks are already pretty speculative, perhaps too much so for some readers. I want to go further in
the same direction, by offering some conjectures about the
overall effects of arguing and bargaining in private and public
settings. By 'overall effects' I have in mind some criterion
that somehow takes account both of efficiency and equity.
According to this criterion private settings are always better
than public settings, for a given mode of communication; and
arguing is always better than bargaining, for a given setting.
Roughly speaking, arguing is better than bargaining because
of the civilizing force of hypocrisy, and private settings better
than public settings because they leave less room for precommitment and overbidding.293
To be sure, one may think of exceptions to this tendency. If the initial endowments, although unequal, have a clean pedigree, there is nothing objectionable In an
unequal outcome of bargaining. If the better-endowed adopt the optimal Impartial
argument they may get less than their fair share. I believe, however, that in most
actual cases greater initial endowments are due to luck or unfair exploitation rather
than to hard work, saving or risk-taking. Needless to say. this Is not a statement for
which proof can be offered. It is based on a rough overall assessment of historical
trends, not on quantifiable analysis.
Recall that in this Part, I am consistently assuming self-interested motives.
However, the setting of the debates- secret versus open, private versus public- can
also affect the quality of the debates among impartial framers. In Part IV. I showed
how imperfectly rational framers may be negatively affected by publicity, because
their vanity will not allow them to say that they were mistaken. An example from
Tocqueville will show that a similar argument applies to genuinely impartial. fully
rational framers. Before the insurrection of June 1848, but apprehensive of its
coming, he felt that "what was needed was not so much a good constitution as some
constitution or other." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVIU.E, Souvenirs, tn ALEMS DE TOCQUEVILLE
729, 826 (Robert Laffont ed., 1986) (sentence omitted In English translation). Acting
under time pressure, he was "more concerned with putting a powerful leader quickly
at the head of the Republic than with drafting a perfect republican Constitution."
TOCQUEVILLE, RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 43, at 178. After the June days he stood
by this proposal, but now for the reason that "having announced to the nation that
this ardently desired right would be granted, It was no longer possible to refuse It.'
27
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Fig. 2

Figure 2 ranks the possible cases according to the mixed
criterion. Note that the claims that arguing is superior to
bargaining, and secrecy to publicity (ceteris paribus), are
compatible both with secret bargaining being superior to
public argument and with the opposite ranking. If the two
dimensions were independent of each other, this ambiguity
would not matter, since one would always go for the first-best
arrangement of arguing in private. However, as indicated by
the arrows (and explained above), secrecy tends to induce
bargaining, and publicity to induce argument.2
The real
choice, therefore, may be between the second-best and the
third-best options.
I have tried to show how strategic actors may find it in
their interest to substitute an impartial argument for a direct
statement of their interest. They may also find it useful to
substitute truth claims for credibility claims. Instead of
making a threat whose efficacy depends on its perceived

Id Similarly, the announcement of the radical measures taken on the night of
August 4th 1789 made it impossible to go back. In a wonderful contemporary
phrase: "The people are penetrated by the benefits they have been promised; they
will not let themselves be de-penetrated." Mathiez, supra note 81, at 265 n.4. When
the debates are open to the public, announcements may be irreversible.
299 This phenomenon is often referred to
as "pseudo dominance." See David
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, PsychologicalBarriers to Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS
TO CONFLICT RESOLUrION 53 (K. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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credibility, they may utter a warning that serves the same
purpose and avoids the difficulties associated with threats.
One difficulty is that of making the threat appear credible.
Following Schelling, many authors have discussed various
Here I shall discuss
ways of overcoming this problem.m
warnings for the
substituting
to
amount
strategies that
rather than
truth
of
one
issue
the
making
threats, thus
settled a ' I
not
is
point
this
on
terminology
The
credibility.
use 'warning' to denote utterances about events that are not
within the control of the actors and "threat" to denote utterances about those that are. Threats are statements about
what the speaker wilL do, warnings about what wilL (or may)
happen, independently of any actions taken by the speaker.
Thus understood, warnings are factual statements that are
subject to the normal rules of truth-oriented communication.
Disregarding a warning is more like disbelieving a statement
about the past than it is like calling a bluff.
The idea of substituting warnings for threats can be illustrated by a look at wage negotiations. Sometimes, a union
leader will say things like, "if you don't give us what we ask
for, I won't be able to stop my members from going on strike,"
or, "if you don't give us what we ask for, the morale of my
members will fall and productivity will suffer." Formally,
these are warnings rather than threats. Needless to say,
managers will not always take them at face value. They may
suspect that the effects cited in the warnings are actually
within the control of the union boss. At the same time, they
cannot be sure that the leader does not have access to information which they lack. Perhaps his members are in fact as
recalcitrant as he makes them out to be. Perhaps he has
made sure, before coming to the bargaining table, that they
are so heated up that he will not be able to stop them, turning them in effect into a 'Doomsday Machine'. Note the difference between the latter strategy and other pre-bargaining
ploys. Often, unions invest in the credibility of threats, e.g. by
building up a strike fund. Alternatively, they can invest in
the truth of wamings, e.g. by irreversibly stirring up discono See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES. supra note 2. at 587.

See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 251 (1992)
(referring to "warning threats" as if an utterance could be both a vrarning and a
threat). Other writers use the distinction between warning and threat to differentiate
between cases in which the actor has an incentive to carry out the announced action
and those in which he does not. See, e.g.. SCHELLING. supra note 8. at 123 & n.5:
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds.. 1969). To tell a burglar that I will call the police unless he goes
away is to warn him; to tell a girl that I will commit suicide if she does not consent to
marry me is to make a threat
so
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tent among the members.
The distinction can also be illustrated by some of the episodes from the two assemblies that I discussed in Part V
above. The statement by Bedford cited earlier is most plausibly seen as a threat, with the reference to the "natural consequence" serving to underline its credibility."
At the very
least, the reply by Gouverneur Morris shows that he understood (or appeared to understand) it as a threat rather than a
warning.m Morris' counterattack is perhaps more ambiguous. However, some of the other delegates certainly took him
as making a threat, as indicated by the following retreat by
Williamson on his behalf. "He did not conceive that (Mr.
Govr. Morris) meant that the sword ought to be drawn agst.
the smaller states. He only pointed out the probable consequences of anarchy in the U.S."3 In other words, Wlliamson
sought to make it clear that Morris had been uttering a
warning, not making a threat. On the same day, Bedford also
retreated, by making it clear that
[hle did not mean that the small States would court the aid &
interposition of foreign powers. He meant that they would not
consider the federal compact as dissolved until it should be so by
the acts of the large States. In this case the consequence of the
breach of faith on their part, and the readiness of the small
States to fulfill their engagements, would be that foreign nations
having demands on this Country would find it in their interest to
take the small States by the hand, in order to do themselves justice.- °5

Again, what was initially made (or understood) as a threat,
is restated as a warning. In a moment I shall discuss the
reasons speakers may have for making such restatements.
First, however, I want to reconsider some of the French debates in this new perspective. In the speeches cited above,
Mirabeau referred successively to the people, to the soldiers,
and to the assembly members themselves to suggest the dangers to the King of his provocative behavior.3" The reference
to the people is perhaps most plausibly seen as a warning.
The reference to the troops is closer to a threat. Although
overtly Mirabeau is simply reminding the King that the soldiers are men by nature, he was probably understood as
saying that he might help nature along by stirring fermentao2 See 1 FARRAND, supranote 1, at 492. The statement, that
is, may be taken as a
warning in the sense of Schelling, but not in the sense used here. See SCHELLINO,
supra note 8,at 123 & n.5.
See discussion suprapart
IV.
3o 1 FARRAND, supra note
1, at 532.
305 Id. at 531.
306 See discussion supra Part
IV.
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tion among the troops. And in the reference to the delegates
themselves, the threat is hardly disguised at all. Here, Mirabeau presents himself, and his fellow delegates, as subject to
a psychic causality not within their own control. If the King
provokes them, they might respond irrationally and violently.
Formally, this is a mere warning. In reality, nobody could ignore that it was a threat. 7
We may also reconsider the tractations between Mounier
and the triumvirate. In their last meeting, the three responded by threatening to mobilize public opinion against
him. Their statement was probably neither meant nor understood as a threat to mobilize Paris against the Assembly.0
Nevertheless, the defeat of bicameralism on September 10
and the adoption of a merely suspensive veto for the King on
September 11 were in large part due to the fact that some
delegates feared for their lives.2 0 We may reasonably ask,
therefore, whether the patriots in Versailles, through their
contacts with journalists and pamphleteers in Paris, deliberately sought to raise the temperature so that they could say
to the moderates, truthfully, that their lives were in danger if
they voted for bicameralism and the absolute veto. The views
of the actors and of later historians differ on this issue."" My
own opinion, for what it is worth, is that it is hard to believe
that the thought of acting in this way did not cross somebody's mind. And if some members of the Assembl~e Constituante were indeed stirring up things in Paris, we may also
ask, in retrospect, whether they were not playing the sorcerer's apprentice.
There are two reasons why a speaker might find it to his
advantage to substitute warnings for threats. First, he does
not have to worry as much about credibility. Even though his
adversaries know that the events referred to in the warning
may in fact be within his control, they must also take account
of the possibility that he may have access to relevant private
information. It is not unreasonable to think that the union
leader knows more than the management about the state of
mind of his members. Similarly, Mlrabeau might be expected
to know more than the King about the psychology of the delegates to the Assembly. Second, warnings are factual statements that belong to the realm of argument and hence enable
W7 In some cases, though, predictions about one's own future behavior may be
uttered as genuine warnings. See FRANK supra note 274, at 55, passtn.
3W See 1 ORATEURS, supra note 2, at 935; Mathlez. supra note 81. at 267.
W9 See EGRET, supranote 15, at 154. 158.
310 Mounier and Mathiez do not find evidence of deliberate instigation.
See
ORATEURS, supranote 2, at 935. EgreVs view is more ambiguous. See EGRET. supra
note 15. at 142-43.

JOURNAL OF CONST7TUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 2:2

the speaker to avoid the opprobrium associated with naked
appeals to bargaining power. At the Federal Convention, the
restatement of threats as warnings allowed the proceedings to
stay within the rules of the debating game. Similarly, Mirabeau could warn the King about his soldiers without risking
the accusations of seditious talk that would have been made
had he threatened to stir up unrest among the troops."'
Among the consequences of this substitutional strategy,
two stand out. First, it can shift the balance of power, because not all actors may have available to them plausible
warning-equivalents of their natural threats. Whereas union
leaders can and do warn about the unruly behavior of their
members, management cannot similarly disguise their threat
of a lockout as a warning. If the King claims that he cannot
control his soldiers, that is a sign of weakness, not of
strength. By contrast, a revolutionary leader who claims that
he may not be able to contain his followers does not thereby
lose his legitimacy. Second, the substitution induces the
risk, already cited, of setting in motion a process that goes
further than its instigators intended. If a leader stirs up unrest and discontent among his followers for the purpose of
being able to make true warnings about what will happen if
their wishes are not heeded, he may get more than he bargained for. The action of a crowd does not lend itself to fine
tuning.
Earlier I argued that the effects of substituting impartial
arguments for self-interest were, on the whole, beneficial. I
cannot make a similar claim about the consequences of substituting warnings for threats. If anything, the overall effect
can be expected to be negative. In general, there is no reason
to think that the shift in balance of power caused by unequal
availability of warning-equivalents will lead to more equitable
outcomes. And when both sides can, and do, invest in the
truth of their warnings, efficiency will suffer. Moreover, the
tendency for induced popular fermentation to get out of hand
can easily lead to outcomes that nobody had intended or desired.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In the Introduction, I cited three objectives that have
guided this Article. I shall try to say something about the
311 We may note at this point the possibility
of self-fulfiUlng warnings, which are, in
this respect, intermediate between ordinary warnings and threats. By publicly telling the King that his troops were unreliable, Mirabeau may in fact have ensured the
truth of that statement.
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extent to which, and in which respects, they have been satisfied.
The historical objective has certainly been the least ambitious. I have cited constitutional debates and decisions
mainly to illustrate ideas derived from the more theoretical
objectives, not because I think these ideas can provide complete explanations of these episodes. However, I am not sure
that complete explanations will ever be forthcoming. Explanations in the social sciences should, in my opinion, be organized around (partial) mechanisms rather than around
(general) theories.3 By lowering the explanatory ambitions of
the social sciences in general, I can also raise my own compared to that more modest ideal. The self-undermining of the
convening authorities, the technique of procedural precommitment, the reliance on inside rather than outside options
as sources of bargaining power, the substitution of impartial
claims for self-interested ones, and the substitution of warnings for threats- these are mechanisms that have some potential for shedding light on the behavior of the eighteenthcentury framers. I can at most claim to have shown their intelligibility and, I hope, their consistency with the historical
record. To show their applicability- to take the step from
just-so stories to actual explanations- would require competence that I cannot even begin to claim.
The sociological objective has been to contribute to the
comparative study of constitution-making. Not, for the reasons just stated, to a "general theory of constitution-making",
but to a better understanding of the situations in which constitutional conventions are called into being, their internal
dynamics, and their relation with the extra-constitutional environment. Because my focus has been on a very limited
subset of constitution-making episodes, I cannot claim to
have progressed very far in this task. There are a number of
issues that simply did not arise in Paris and Philadelphia. I
have not touched on the question of constitutional borrowing,
in time and space, that was acutely important in the recent
East European constitution-making processes. I have not
considered constitution-making under tutelage, as in Germany or Japan after World War RI. I have not discussed constitution-making that takes place simultaneously with the
settling of accounts with the old regime, and the complex interaction between forward-looking and backward-looking
considerations.
Instead of accumulating more negatives, let me mention
312 See ELSTER, ALCHEMIES, supranote 147, at 1-47.
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some possible positive accomplishments. Throughout the
Article I have been predominantly concerned with process. In
Part III I tried to identify the main stages in the constitution
and self-constitution of the two conventions. I believe these
are stages that, with some variations, will be found in most
other cases. Moreover, I also suggested some tentative generalizations concerning the relation between the old and the
new regimes. Both assemblies, most notably the French one,
exceeded their mandate. For the reasons given, I believe this
to hold true quite generally. However, the American case also
demonstrates a different mechanism:
the procedure by
which the Convention was called into being left its imprint on
the assembly itself and ultimately on the constitution that it
produced. In Parts IV through VI, I have tried to identify
some mechanisms that can help explain the internal dynamics of the assemblies once they have constituted themselves.
These mechanisms are quite general, in the sense that they
also operate in non-constitutional settings. However, the
pressure on speakers to produce impartial arguments may be
especially strong in the constitutional setting, compared to
ordinary legislatures. At the same time, the tendency towards extra-political bargaining may also be stronger. This
makes for polarization and a heightened sense of drama.
What I called the conceptual objective- sorting out the
relationship between arguing and bargaining- has been the
most important. In this exploration, my starting point was
Habermas's distinction between strategic and communicative
behavior. For years I had been fascinated, attracted, puzzled,
and frustrated by his account of the norms governing communicative behavior. On the one hand, his account of these
nonns seemed obviously (but not trivially) correct. On the
other hand, the sense in which they actually govern communicative behavior proved very elusive. Actual political behavior, an extreme but not atypical case of which is described in
Robert Caro's biography of Robert Moses,1 3 did not seem to
live up to the ideals of rightness and truthfulness. Yet it
would be wrong to say that politics, even at its most savage,
had no relation to the norms identified by Habermas.
I found the resolution of these tensions and puzzles in the
idea of strategic uses of argument. Basically, this is an
elaboration of La Rochefoucauld: "Hypocrisy is the homage
that vice pays to virtue."314 Even Robert Moses was to some

313 See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL
OF NEW YORK ( 1974].
314 FRANCOIS DUC DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 218 (Leonard Tancock trans.,

Penguin Books 1959) (1665).
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extent forced to pay lip service to the ideals he despised.
Whether or not this seriously limited his powers, there are
cases in which the outcome is different because the actors
have to pull some of their punches. This is perhaps the
weakest point of my argument. I cannot see how anyone can
dispute the simple fact of political life that self-interest is often dressed up in impartial garb. What is more contestable,
is whether this will ever make anyone make different substantive claims than they would otherwise have made. My argument for the claim that the garb matters is based on two
premises. First, there are real penalties attached to naked
assertions of self-interest. Second, impartial claims that correspond perfectly to self-interest will in fact be perceived as
naked assertions of self-interest. Because it may be difficult
to decide whether a claim corresponds perfectly or imperfectly
to self-interest, the second premise is necessarily more shaky.
It is also more shaky because people know that315even perfect
I believe,
correspondence need not be a sign of bad faith.
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Even Richard Posner agrees that "[tlo the extent that legislators use Aesopian language to deceive political opponents of
the interest groups behind legislation, they may fool the
political power of those
courts as well and
31 6 thereby limit the
interest groups."
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See PAULVEYNE, LEPAIN E LE CIRQUE 469 (1976).
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Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Consti-
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